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ESSAY
THE PLACE OF “THE PEOPLE” IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Jocelyn Simonson*
The rules and practices of criminal procedure assume a clean
separation between the interests of the public and the interests of the
lone defendant who stands accused. Even the names given to criminal
prosecutions often declare this dichotomy, as in jurisdictions such as
California, Illinois, Michigan, and New York that caption criminal
cases “The People of the State of X v. John Doe.” This Essay argues that
this traditional people/defendant dichotomy is critically ﬂawed and
then builds on that critique to point the way toward a more realistic,
inclusive, and just vision of the role of the public in the criminal process.
The people/defendant dichotomy in the ideology of contemporary
criminal procedure rests on two mistaken premises: ﬁrst, that prosecutors are and should be the primary representatives of the public in the
courtroom; and second, that the rules of criminal procedure must limit
direct public participation to an illusory, limited subset of the public
that is deemed “neutral” and “unbiased.” These conceptions of
representation and neutrality distort the criminal legal system’s
understanding of who “the People” are, marginalizing and excluding
the voices of those members of the community who stand to be harmed by
the defendant’s prosecution or incarceration. As a result, the ideology of
the people/defendant dichotomy promotes practices that are more punitive than the multifaceted interests of the public dictate.
This Essay puts forth a new, alternative approach to thinking
about popular participation in criminal procedure, an approach that
recognizes that “the People” can and do appear on both sides of the scale
of justice. This recognition casts new light on the role of bottom-up
resistance to local police actions and prosecutions—such as through
courtwatching, participatory defense, and community bail funds—by
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those who otherwise do not have a voice in the process. And it directs us
toward procedural rules and constitutional jurisprudence that both
acknowledge communal interests beyond merely protecting “public
safety” and promote an inclusive system of criminal adjudication
responsive to the multidimensional demands of the popular will.
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INTRODUCTION
The customary case caption in criminal court, “The People v.
Defendant,” pits the local community against one lone person in an act
of collective condemnation.1 Or, as the opening credits of Law and Order
tell us, “The people are represented by two separate yet equally important groups: the police, who investigate crime, and the district attorneys,
who prosecute the offenders.”2 Procedures for policing, adjudication,
and punishment often ﬂow from this understanding of prosecutors and

1. See, e.g., Law Reporting Bureau of the State of N.Y., New York Law Reports Style
Manual § 8.1(a) (2012), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/new_styman.htm [https://
perma.cc/F93H-53DD] (“In criminal actions, the prosecuting authority is usually
described as ‘The People of the State of New York.’”). In some jurisdictions, the prosecution is termed “the State,” “the Commonwealth,” or “the United States,” rather than “the
People.” See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, How to Read a Legal Opinion, 11 Green Bag 2d 51, 52
(2007) (describing different types of case captions).
2. Title Sequence, Law & Order (NBC television broadcast 1990–2010).
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police officers as representatives of the public at large.3 We construct the
rules of interaction between accused individuals and the state based on a
balance between, on the one hand, giving individual defendants adequate protections against state power and, on the other hand, smoothing
the wheels of justice so that state actors can do their work of promoting
safety and punishing transgressions on behalf of us all. The public is
brought into conversation with “the People” by voting for prosecutors
and serving on the occasional jury,4 but rarely are members of the public
at large—the people—envisioned as being on the side of defendants
themselves.5
And yet acts of popular intervention on the side of defendants happen every day: A community bail fund posts bail for a stranger;6 activists
surround a police car in which officers have detained a fourteen-year-old
black boy whom the activists have never met;7 a participatory defense
team creates a biographical video about a defendant;8 a group of courtwatchers sits in the audience section of a courtroom to demonstrate support for the accused.9 These acts are sometimes isolated or spontaneous.
But often, they are part of long-term efforts by marginalized groups,
especially poor people of color, to participate in a criminal legal system
3. As discussed in Part II, prosecutors and the police are also bound by obligations
beyond representing public sentiment, including constitutional limits on their conduct
and ethical obligations to serve as “ministers of justice” in a neutral manner.
4. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice 1–40, 176 n.48, 177 n.56
(2012) [hereinafter Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice] (contrasting colonial American
criminal justice, in which the public participated in individual cases, with the modern system of criminal procedure, in which the limited public input comes through elections,
community policing or prosecution, and the rare jury trial).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See, e.g., People Freed, Chi. Cmty. Bond Fund, https://www.chicagobond.org/
#people_freed [https://perma.cc/J5GC-DUAS] (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (describing
stories of people in Chicago for whom the Chicago Community Bond Fund has posted
bond).
7. See Activists Helping Teen Detained by Police Pepper Sprayed in Cleveland, Al
Jazeera Am. ( July 27, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/7/27/blacklives-matter-activists-pepper-sprayed-in-cleveland.html [https://perma.cc/C6NQ-MGC2]
(describing a crowd of Black Lives Matter activists in Cleveland gathering around a police
van in which a fourteen-year-old had been detained, resulting in the release of the child to
his mother without being arrested).
8. See ACJPDEBUG, Photo Recap: National Social Biography Media Boot Camp!,
Albert Cobarrubias Justice Project ( June 6, 2017), https://acjusticeproject.org/2017/
06/06/photo-recap-national-social-biography-media-boot-camp/ [https://perma.cc/SR929QZH] (describing a meeting of participatory defense hubs from around the country to
share strategies for creating social biography videos for use in court).
9. See, e.g., Black Lives Matter Supporters Gather 57,000 Signatures, Vow to Pack
Pasadena Court During Jasmine Richards’ Sentencing Tuesday, Pasadena Now (June 6,
2016), http://www.pasadenanow.com/main/black-lives-matter-supporters-gather-57000signatures-vow-to-pack-pasadena-court-during-jasmine-richards-sentencing-tuesday [https://
perma.cc/W6U2-XW2M] (describing the plans of supporters of an activist convicted of the
felony charge of attempting to unlawfully remove a suspect from police officers to “pack”
the court at her sentencing hearing).
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that they feel does not represent them. Organizer and writer Mariame
Kaba explains this choice starkly: “Petitioning the state which is set up to
kill us for help and protection can be untenable and therefore forces us
to consider new ways of seeking some justice.”10 For Kaba and many other
activists, the futility of trying to have their voices heard by those in charge
of policing and prosecution has led them to turn toward interventions on
behalf of defendants as a means of collective action.
In the context of the criminal courthouse, in particular, marginalized groups have pursued methods of popular participation outside of
the formal mechanisms of voting and jury service, through tactics such as
community bail funds, participatory defense, and courtwatching. Mainstream reactions to these forms of participation range from outrage and
disgust to more subtle requests for dialogue and decorum.11 But rarely
are these bottom-up acts of participation recognized as a legitimate part
of our work of seeing justice done; rarely do we acknowledge in any
formal manner that the arrest and prosecution of an individual can run
against the interests of local community members.12 By relegating communal interventions on behalf of defendants to the status of problematic
interference, rather than productive public participation, the ideology of
criminal procedure facilitates the exclusion of marginalized communities
from everyday criminal adjudication.
This Essay explores the disconnect between the leading conceptions
of the proper place of public interventions in criminal procedure and
the on-the-ground reality of groups who participate in everyday adjudication on behalf of defendants. The idea that “the Prosecution” is synonymous with “the People,” implicit in the case captions of California,
Illinois, Michigan, and New York, serves as a jumping-off point for a
larger examination of how we think about public participation in the
criminal process. Despite this focus on the term “the People,” this Essay
is not centrally concerned with the meaning of “the People” in the text
of the Constitution—whether it is “the People” of the Second or Fourth
Amendments13 or the “We, the People” of the Preamble.14 Instead, I
10. Mariame Kaba, Free Us All: Participatory Defense Campaigns as Abolitionist
Organizing, New Inquiry (May 8, 2017), https://thenewinquiry.com/free-us-all/ [https://
perma.cc/QF98-2NQV] [hereinafter Kaba, Free Us All] (explaining why Kaba and other
activists engage in participatory defense campaigns).
11. See infra section I.C.
12. See infra sections I.B–.C.
13. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625 (2008) (limiting the
operative meaning of “the people” in the Second Amendment to “law-abiding citizens”),
with United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (deﬁning “the people”
in the Fourth Amendment as “a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country”).
14. Cf. Michael Perry, We the People: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme
Court 15–32 (1999) (describing how the deﬁnition of “we” in “We, the People” changes
based on which part of the Constitution is being analyzed); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 Const. Comment. 47, 58–59 (2006) (providing an

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273565

2019]

“THE PEOPLE” IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

253

examine the dominant ways in which we think about the uses and limits
of public participation in criminal procedure, more broadly conceived:
not only constitutional doctrine, but also statutory, administrative, and
customary rules and practices that structure everyday criminal adjudication. When a judge orders a spectator to leave the courtroom or a clerk
tells a community group that they cannot post bail, those official acts are
as much a part of procedure as any formal rule.15 What emerges from
examining both constitutional doctrine and these on-the-ground realities
of everyday procedure is a striking dichotomy between the idea of a
collective “people,” and the lone defendant on the other side of the “v.”
This people/defendant dichotomy is problematic for a number of
reasons. First, it assumes that the prosecution and the police adequately
represent, or at least are capable of adequately representing, the interests
of a local “community.” In reality, however, the unequal distribution of
political power means that the decisions of “the People” are often not
responsive to the interests of the poor populations of color most likely to
come into contact with the criminal process as arrestees, defendants, or
victims.16 Moreover, seeking public input only on behalf of policing and
originalist interpretation of the term “We, the People”); Sanford Levinson, Who, if Anyone,
Really Trusts “We the People”?, 37 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 311, 317 (2011) (arguing that it is a
mistake to infer from the “We, the People” of the Preamble that “the People” should
actually rule in any fundamental sense); David A. Strauss, We the People, They the People,
and the Puzzle of Democratic Constitutionalism, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1969, 1973–77 (2013)
(distinguishing between “We, the People” at the time of the drafting of the Constitution
and the meaning of “the People” in constitutional interpretation today). For an argument
that the constitutional ideal of “We, the People” should be a central animating goal of
criminal procedure, see Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice,
111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1455, 1483–86 (2017) [hereinafter Kleinfeld, Three Principles].
15. Cf. Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 149 (1968) [hereinafter
Packer, Limits] (describing “the criminal process” as “a compendious term that stands for
all the complexes of activity that operate to bring the substantive law of crime to bear (or
to keep it from coming to bear) on persons who are suspected of having committed
crimes”); Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction: Mapping the New Criminal
Justice Thinking [hereinafter Dolovich & Natapoff, Introduction], in The New Criminal
Justice Thinking 1, 5 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) [hereinafter
Dolovich & Natapoff, The New Criminal Justice] (“[I]t is not enough to look to formal
rules and processes. We must also attend to the reality on the ground . . . .”). For an
argument advocating for a grounded understanding of criminal procedure, see infra
section I.A.
16. See Nicola Lacey, Humanizing the Criminal Justice Machine: Re-Animated Justice
or Frankenstein’s Monster?, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1299, 1321 (2013) (book review) (“[T]he
‘truly disadvantaged’ groups—who are mainly located in inner-city areas and whose victimization at the hands of both crime and criminal justice underpins their more complex view
of crime and punishment—are rarely the median or decisive voters in the electoral contests
that shape policy.”); see also Traci Burch, Trading Democracy for Justice: Criminal
Convictions and the Decline of Neighborhood Political Participation 75–104 (2013) (documenting the decline of political participation in neighborhoods with higher concentrations of people with criminal records); Amy E. Lerman & Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting
Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control 202–18 (2014)
(describing how contact with the criminal justice system dilutes political engagement);
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prosecution ignores the multifaceted nature of any “community,” 17
excluding strong critiques of reigning practices and resulting in an echo
chamber that reinforces existing notions of justice. I call this set of issues
with the people/defendant dichotomy the representation problem.
The second problem with the people/defendant dichotomy is that it
is imbued with a false sense that our procedures promote “neutrality”
from the public during adjudication and other criminal procedures. To
be “neutral” is to side with the prosecution, not the defendant. The ideal
public (whether voters, juries, courtroom audiences, or the community
at large) becomes a disinterested and decorous public, calm and orderly,
without “bias” against the police or the prosecution. This false ideal of
neutrality allows for the exclusion of members of the public attempting
to participate in ways that align with defendants’ interests. For example,
police officers arrest individuals ﬁlming officers in public for “interference” with police work;18 judges forbid courtroom audience members
from wearing shirts demonstrating support for defendants;19 court clerks
refuse to let community bail funds post bail for strangers;20 and jury
William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 255 (2011) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice] (noting that “voters with the largest stake
[in the process of building and ﬁlling prisons]—chieﬂy African American residents of
high-crime city neighborhoods—had the smallest voice in the relevant decisions”);
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1271, 1291–98 (2004) [hereinafter Roberts, Social and
Moral Cost] (detailing the “role [of mass incarceration] in controlling the social, economic, and political engagement of African American communities in the national polity”).
17. See Laura I. Appleman, Defending the Jury: Crime, Community, and the
Constitution 70–87 (2015) (discussing the difficulties with deﬁning community in relation
to criminal justice); Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures
or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F.
215, 216–17 (critiquing the amorphous concept of community in the context of policing);
Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identiﬁcation,
65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1769, 1770–74 (1992) (describing different conceptions of “community”
among African Americans with respect to criminal justice); Richard Delgado, Goodbye to
Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 769
(2000) (“In a diverse, multicultural society, many collectivities may vie for th[e] status [of
community].”); Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community,”
2003 Utah L. Rev. 343, 343 (critiquing the idea of community in the context of the
restorative justice and “community justice” movements).
18. See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to
Record the Police, 104 Geo. L.J. 1559, 1560–63 (2016) [hereinafter Simonson, Beyond
Body Cameras] (describing resistance against organized copwatchers and individuals who
record the police).
19. See, e.g., Lindsay Corcoran, Judge Says Worcester Protestor Can’t Wear Black
Lives Matter Shirt During Trial, Mass Live (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.masslive.com/
news/worcester/index.ssf/2015/11/judge_says_worcester_protestor.html [https://perma.cc/
S276-5457]; Ruthann Robson, Judge Bans Spectator Symbols in Cecily McMillan’s Trial,
Dressing Constitutionally (Apr. 7, 2014), http://www.dressingconstitutionally.com/2014/04/
07/judge-bans-spectator-symbols-in-cecily-mcmillans-trial/ [https://perma.cc/XWJ8-35XS].
20. See, e.g., Toby Sells, Just City’s Bail Program Worked in Nashville, Can’t Get
Consensus in Memphis, Memphis Flyer (July 14, 2016), https://www.memphisﬂyer.com/
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selection excludes individuals with criminal records or negative views of
the police.21 Under the guise of neutrality, popular efforts to intervene
on behalf of defendants become interference with the rule of law rather
than welcome participation. In the process, our estimations of public
sentiment become distorted toward the prosecution. This focus on the
creation of a neutral public that is not biased toward the defense also
cements the status of arrestees and defendants as the “other,” as a group
of outsiders different from the average member of the public, rather
than of the public. 22 This, in turn, colors the interpretation and
implementation of procedural rules. I think of this as the neutrality problem.
My argument is that under the umbrella of the people/defendant
dichotomy, the representation problem and the neutrality problem
together contribute to a concept of criminal procedure that moves us
away from truly responsive local justice23 and toward practices that are
more punitive than the multifaceted interests of the public dictate. The
people/defendant dichotomy constructs a limited and exclusionary view
of which “public” matters in criminal adjudication. If we think of all
members of the public as represented by “the People” and all those who
might side with a defendant as “biased,” then we exclude from criminal
adjudication those who would disagree with a prosecution or support a
defendant, shutting out an entire subset of the public who might bring
more contestatory views to the table. In doing so, procedural rules and
practices do not simply mirror existing political inequalities—they create
them. 24 This Essay is thus about ideology, about how the reigning
NewsBlog/archives/2016/07/14/just-citys-bail-program-worked-in-nashville-cant-get-consensusin-memphis [https://perma.cc/CV4H-VBSR] (describing procedural hoops set up by clerks
and judges in Memphis that prevented activists from operating a community bail fund).
21. See Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 Am. U. L. Rev.
65, 70–71 (2003) (describing exclusion of individuals with criminal records from juries);
Anna Roberts, Disparately Seeking Jurors: Disparate Impact and the (Mis)use of Batson, 45
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1359, 1403–04 (2012) [hereinafter Roberts, Disparately Seeking] (describing doctrine that comfortably allows prosecutors to strike from juries individuals with
negative views of, or interactions with, the police and the criminal justice system).
22. See Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 Geo. L.J. 1481, 1522–23 (2017) (describing
the “‘othering’ effect” of reigning retributivist models of American criminal courts);
Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1608 (1986) [hereinafter
Cover, Violence] (explaining that when interpretive communities focus on a judge’s neutral interpretation, they distance themselves from the pain of the defendant); cf. Sune
Qvotrup Jensen, Othering, Identity Formation and Agency, 2 Qualitative Stud. 63, 66–67
(2011) (describing the process of “othering” of minority groups so that they are imbued
in the dominant culture with undesirable characteristics).
23. See Philippe Nonet & Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition 77 (1978)
(deﬁning responsive legal institutions as those which open themselves up to adaptation by
“perceiv[ing] social pressures as sources of knowledge and opportunities for self-correction”).
24. See Janet Moore, The Antidemocratic Sixth Amendment, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1705,
1718–20 (2016) (noting how the inability of indigent defendants to choose counsel
exacerbates the already existing inequalities in the justice system); Alexandra Natapoff,
Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1449, 1452 (2005)
[hereinafter Natapoff, Speechless] (describing how procedure leads to the “expressive
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assumptions structuring how we think about the criminal adjudicatory
process legitimize inequitable practices and limit how we design procedures and approach reform.
I explore an alternative approach to thinking about popular participation in criminal procedure, and especially in the adjudication of
criminal cases. With this approach, “the People” appear on both sides of
the scale of justice in individual cases; no longer can the prosecution call
itself “the People.” I look to the bottom-up practices of marginalized
groups intervening on behalf of defendants to show the possibility of a
different way of thinking about the place of the people in the criminal
process, one in which members of the public are allowed to voice their
support or opposition through procedural channels other than elections,
juries, or community justice fora. If a central purpose of criminal procedure becomes to channel the will of the people into both sides of each
individual criminal case—the prosecution and the defense—then popular efforts to intervene on behalf of criminal defendants take on
legitimacy and importance. They become part of our system, worthy of
examination in any comprehensive debate over how we design our
procedures.
This Essay is part of a larger vision of the importance of leaving the
sphere of criminal law open to communal resistance and to agonistic
participation—forms of direct participation that engage with powerful
state institutions in a respectful but adversarial manner.25 Crucial to this
vision is a view that local criminal adjudication is and should be a site of
communal contestation and resistance.26 This does not mean that all
disempowerment of those disadvantaged groups who tend to become defendants”); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist
Framework, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 261, 279–86 (2007) [hereinafter Roberts,
Constructing a Criminal Justice System] (describing the criminal justice system’s “antidemocratic function”).
25. See Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and
Resistance, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1609, 1611–13 (2017) [hereinafter Simonson, Democratizing
Criminal Justice] (describing this larger vision); see also Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching,
104 Calif. L. Rev. 391, 413–27 (2016) [hereinafter Simonson, Copwatching] (using the
lens of agonism to argue for the importance of respecting the practice of organized
copwatching by marginalized populations). On agonism, see generally Chantal Mouffe,
Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically 1–19 (2013) [hereinafter Mouffe, Agonistics]
(summarizing a theoretical framework of agonistic politics); I. Bennett Capers, Criminal
Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 653, 700–01 (2018) [hereinafter
Capers, Good Citizen] (describing the benefits of agonistic confrontations between civilians
and the police); Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community
Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 Wake Forest L. Rev. 793, 804–07
(2016) (using the theory of agonism to argue that we should respect and uplift the participation of grassroots groups in police consent decrees).
26. On the importance of resistance to everyday criminal justice, see Jenny E. Carroll,
The Resistance Defense, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 589, 641–42 (2013); Eric J. Miller, Encountering
Resistance: Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice, 2016 U. Chi. Legal F. 295, 343
[hereinafter Miller, Encountering Resistance]; Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A
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contestation is healthy or desirable. In the end, some popular interventions on behalf of defendants may skew the results of adjudication in
ways that subvert our notions of fairness or the rule of law. But our starting point should be a presumption that popular interventions on behalf
of defendants are legitimate, followed by an examination of whether they
excessively undermine other competing values.
Part I begins by situating my argument within current debates over
both the ideology of criminal procedure and the politics of criminal law.
It then describes how bottom-up forms of communal contestation in
everyday justice, including community bail funds, participatory defense,
and courtwatching, present a vision of public intervention that does not
ﬁt neatly into existing narratives of popular participation. Part II lays out
the contours of the dichotomy between “the People” and the defendant
in our reigning ideology of criminal procedure. I argue that the
people/defendant dichotomy carries with it two particular ideological
problems: ﬁrst, a limited focus on public participation through representatives, and second, an illusory conception of a public that is “neutral” and
unbiased. Part III conceptualizes how the public might instead participate
on both sides of individual conﬂicts in the criminal courtroom. Under
this approach, a state might facilitate, rather than silence, direct, contestatory forms of participation in criminal adjudication most often found
on the defendant side of the “v.” Finally, Part IV defends the conception
of placing “the People” on both sides in individual criminal cases against
the charge that it would unduly undermine the rule of law by connecting
everyday contestation in criminal adjudication to the possibility of largescale decarceration more broadly.
I. IDEOLOGY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND DEMOCRACY
This Essay identiﬁes, and then sets out an alternative to, a central
ideological idea in criminal procedure: that the public’s input should fall
only on the side of “the People,” or the prosecution. In this Part, I situate
this argument within current debates over, on the one hand, the study of
ideology in criminal procedure and, on the other, the place of popular
participation in criminal adjudication. My goal is to bridge these two
conversations, revealing the connection between how we think about
criminal procedure and the inclusion of generally disempowered populations in our reigning conceptions of justice and fairness. A criminal legal
system responsive to all facets of a local “community” should be one that
facilitates collective forms of participation that challenge powerful
institutional actors and dominant ideas of justice. Current forms of bottom-up communal contestation led by members of historically disempowered populations demonstrate how this might be possible and should
inform our understandings of the interaction between the design of
Counter-Narrative of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 1555, 1558–60
(2015).
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criminal procedures and the possibilities of public participation in everyday justice.
A.

The Ideology of Criminal Procedure

In legal scholarship, there is a rich history of thinking broadly about
the structure of rules, doctrines, and cultures that produce everyday
criminal law and its processes—and often reproduce existing hierarchies
and pathologies.27 In the context of criminal procedure, Herbert Packer
famously posed two competing “models” of criminal procedure in the
1960s: the “Due Process model” and the “Crime Control model.” 28
Packer argues that how we think of the purpose of criminal procedure—
as a vehicle for due process or as a means of facilitating speedy prosecutions—in turn mediates the interpretation of constitutional and procedural rules. Packer’s models have spawned a wide range of critiques and
adjustments, which further both positive and normative models of how
we structure our criminal procedures.29 A central insight of the literature
on ideology and criminal procedure is that the principles we use to frame
our procedures in turn shape the cultures of our precincts, courthouses,
27. For examples in criminal justice scholarship, see, e.g., David Sklansky, Democracy
and the Police 1–13 (2008) [hereinafter Sklansky, Democracy] (describing the links
between conceptions of democracy and policing models); Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and
Control in the Carceral State, 16 Berkeley J. Crim. L. 259, 265 (2011) (describing “the
‘cognitive conventions’ by which current penal practices are rendered at once logical and
legitimate,” including the focus on defendant autonomy and responsibility); Malcolm M.
Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 Criminology 449, 452–55 (1992) (describing a shift in
penological discourse marked by “the replacement of a moral or clinical description of the
individual with an actuarial language of probabilistic calculations and statistical distributions applied to populations”); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform
from the American Experiment with Capital Punishment, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 733, 783 (2014)
(arguing for the importance of paying attention to the “public framing, discourse, and
rhetoric” in constitutional regulation of the death penalty); Michael Tonry, Evidence,
Ideology, and Politics in the Making of American Criminal Justice Policy, 42 Crime & Just.
1, 8 (2013) (arguing that criminal justice policy is inﬂuenced by “the ﬁlter of prevailing
paradigms and ways of thinking”).
28. Packer, Limits, supra note 15, at 153; Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the
Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1964).
29. See, e.g., Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and Fairness in the Due
Process Model, 36 Law & Soc. Inquiry 237, 237–38, 240 (2011) (discussing John Griffiths’s
critique that Packer’s models “in fact presented two sides of the same model: the ‘battle’
between the ‘police perspective’ and the ‘ACLU perspective’”); John Griffiths, Ideology in
Criminal Procedure or a Third “Model” of the Criminal Process, 79 Yale L.J. 359, 367–75
(1970) (critiquing both of Packer’s models and proposing a new “Family Model” of criminal procedure); Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in Dolovich & Natapoff, The
New Criminal Justice, supra note 15, at 72–73, 92 [hereinafter Natapoff, The Penal
Pyramid] (proposing a new model of analyzing criminal procedure focusing on the differences in the criminal process along lines of race, class, gender, and other factors); Kent
Roach, Four Models of the Criminal Process, 89 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 671, 672 (1999)
(acknowledging the signiﬁcance of Packer’s Due Process and Crime Control models but
suggesting an alternative approach).
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prisons, and other sites of interaction between criminal justice actors and
the public. Although these principles are not always explicit, nor are they
uniform, they constitute a set of ideas and assumptions that run beneath
the operation of the criminal process and legitimize the status quo.30
A full study of the ideology of criminal procedure requires moving
beyond analyses of constitutional doctrine. As Packer puts it, studying
criminal procedure demands attending to all of “the complexes of
activity that operate to bring the substantive law of crime to bear (or to
keep it from coming to bear) on persons who are suspected of having
committed crimes.”31 Indeed, although the term “criminal procedure”
can at times be shorthand for “constitutional criminal procedure,” scholars and teachers are increasingly recognizing that we must study and
teach well beyond the doctrine to capture the reality of criminal adjudication on the ground.32 “Criminal procedure” is thus a combination of
30. See Mirjan Damaška, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal
Procedure, 84 Yale L.J. 480, 530 (1975) (“In discovering affinities between ideology and
criminal procedure we are actually canvassing ideological arguments advanced in support
of existing procedural arrangements and in opposition to their change.”). To use the term
ideology to describe a conception of procedure underscores the potential of ingrained
ideas about the legal and political world to legitimate and normalize systemic injustices. In
Gramscian terms, legal ideology plays a role in perpetuating hegemonic relationships. See
Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci 180–81 (Quintin Hoare &
Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971). See generally Tommie Shelby, Dark Ghettos
(2017) (deﬁning ideology as “a widely held set of associated beliefs and implicit judgments
that misrepresent signiﬁcant social realities and that function, through this distortion, to
bring about or perpetuate unjust social relations”). The legitimating function of legal
ideology is a core insight of both critical legal studies and critical race theory. See, e.g.,
Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049, 1051–52 (1978)
(arguing that legal doctrine can legitimate the existing social structure—but only if “it
holds out a promise of liberation”); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner
Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 268
(1978) (noting that the Court began to elaborate the boundaries of “legitimate” labor
activity through development of Wagner Act doctrine).
31. Packer, Limits, supra note 15, at 149. Packer further argues that criminal procedure is both the rules of law and “patterns of official activity that correspond only in the
roughest kind of way to the prescriptions of procedural rules.” Id. In other words, if under
our expansive criminal codes we are all technically criminals, procedure is the complex of
activities and rules that allow us to differentiate between those whom the state controls
and supervises in the name of public safety, and those whom it does not. Cf. Damaška,
supra note 30, at 481 (arguing that scholars of ideology and criminal procedure should
“discard[] a preoccupation with legal mythology to consider law as it is actually applied”);
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 53 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship] (“The problem with the criminal process may not be particular rules or practices, but rather the system that deﬁnes what that process should look like.”).
32. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 Colum. L.
Rev. 1303, 1305–06 (2018) (describing the importance of subconstitutional court rules and
state laws governing procedures of plea bargaining); Dolovich & Natapoff, Introduction,
supra note 15, at 5 (“[I]t is not enough to look to formal rules and processes. We must also
attend to the reality on the ground . . . .”); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing,
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the rules and practices—constitutional, statutory, administrative, and
customary—that structure contact with the criminal legal system for
those suspected and accused of crimes. Widely held conceptions of these
interactions in turn structure scholarship, doctrine, and the day-to-day
practices of our courthouses and precincts.
The ideology of criminal procedure is especially important in the
post-trial world of mass prosecutions and plea bargaining, in which
“processes”—a stop-and-frisk, the provision of counsel, the decision to
set bail—often determine as much as anything else the “substantive” outcome of a case or interaction.33 Alexandra Natapoff recently theorized a
model of criminal procedure that accounts for the differences between
the substance-driven prosecutions of well-resourced defendants charged
with serious crimes, often in federal court, and the experiences of less
privileged defendants who are rushed through the criminal justice system
without a thorough airing of the charges against them. Natapoff locates
the experiences of poor people of color charged with low-level offenses
as the bottom of a “penal pyramid”: a place where under-resourced defendants charged with low-level cases face “outcomes . . . driven by institutional practices and inegalitarian social relations.”34 At the bottom of the
penal pyramid, where the vast majority of criminal cases take place,
formal rules and methods of public intervention escape from view in
favor of top-down institutional practices that facilitate control and surveillance along lines of class, race, and gender.35 In these situations, procedure is the control and the surveillance—the system doles out what Issa
Kohler-Hausmann has termed “procedural hassle,” rather than conviction
110 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 768–81 (2012) (arguing that scholars must look beyond constitutional doctrine in thinking about the regulation of the police); Adriaan Lanni & Carol
Steiker, A Thematic Approach to Teaching Criminal Adjudication, 60 St. Louis U. L.J. 463,
464–66 (2016) (urging a move beyond constitutional rules in teaching about the rules of
criminal adjudication); Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1197, 1199–223
(2016) (describing the importance of looking at procedural protections beyond constitutional rights in the context of interrogations).
33. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1692–703 (2010) (describing how discretionary
decisions by police officers and prosecutors lead to the processing of misdemeanor arrests
in a way that diverges from determinations of guilt and innocence); Paul Heaton et al.,
The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 711,
722–23, 747 (2017) (describing how the setting of bail in low-level cases leads to a greater
likelihood of guilty pleas and longer jail sentences); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors,
85 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1313, 1346–47 (2012) (describing how procedural pressures lead to “the
perfect storm of wrongful pleas”). Indeed, the procedures themselves are often the heart of
the experience of being prosecuted. See Malcolm M. Feeley, The Process Is the Punishment
222–43 (1979) (describing how the pretrial process amounts to its own form of punishment); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119
Am. J. Soc. 351, 355–57 (2013) (describing how the charging and processing of misdemeanor cases serves as a form of control even in the absence of convictions).
34. Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, supra note 29, at 92.
35. Id. at 75–90.
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or formal punishment. 36 A full account of the ideology of criminal
procedure in the post-trial world must therefore explore the relationship
between the beliefs and judgments underlying procedural practices and
the perpetuation of on-the-ground conditions of inequality.
B.

The Public Participation Dilemma

How we think about criminal procedure is intimately connected to
how we think about popular participation in criminal adjudication.
Should members of the public be active participants in everyday criminal
justice, or should the world of plea bargaining foreclose public intervention in favor of neutral processing by public representatives? Haunting
this question is the widespread (though not universal) view that the current phenomena of “mass incarceration”37 and “overcriminalization”38
have been caused by a public bent toward “penal populism,” a hunger
for criminalization and punishment beyond what is fair or rational.39 This
public, lacking a nuanced understanding of the causes of crime or the
consequences of punishment, should perhaps not be trusted with control
over efforts at decarceration or criminal-law reform at the individual
level. At the same time, however, there is growing concern from scholars
of criminal law and procedure that our post-trial world, in which juries
are largely absent, too comfortably excludes the public from everyday
adjudication, resulting in a system divorced from popular ideals of justice
and fairness.40 Under this view, we might do well to include the public
more often in our adjudication of cases, whether by expanding the use of

36. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 33, at 353.
37. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. Rev. 545, 549
(2017) (“Today, mass incarceration rolls comfortably off the tongues of people of all
ideological stripes.”); Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform,
117 Mich. L. Rev. 259, 276–84 (2018) (describing the scholarly conception of mass
incarceration).
38. See generally Douglas N. Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal
Law (2008) (examining the relationship between “too much” criminal law and “too much
punishment”); Andrew Ashworth, Conceptions of Overcriminalization, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim.
L. 407 (2008) (discussing the need for a “consequentialist audit of criminal laws”); Levin,
supra note 37, at 292–302 (describing the scholarly conception of overcriminalization);
Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 703 (2005) (deﬁning
overcriminalization as a phenomenon to be evaluated in the aggregate for “causes, consequences, and correctives”).
39. See generally Julian V. Roberts et al., Penal Populism and Popular Opinion:
Lessons from Five Countries 310 (2002) (“Most populist penal policies create disproportionate punishment and are proﬂigate with respect to the use of incarceration.”).
40. See Laura I. Appleman, Defending the Jury: Crime, Community, and the Constitution
91–219 (2015); Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 29–60; Albert Dzur,
Punishment, Participatory Democracy, and the Jury 21–41 (2012); Kleinfeld, Three
Principles, supra note 14, at 1483–88; see also infra note 53.
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juries or creating new institutions of “community justice.” This public
participation dilemma pervades contemporary scholarship.41
The dominant contemporary conception of how to mediate public
participation in contemporary criminal adjudication is to give the public
input into systemic laws, policies, and priorities but keep individual cases
against defendants free of public interference, except in the rare case of
a jury trial. This is the backbone of a particular conception of the rule of
law, in which procedural rules and criminal laws are deﬁned by
democratically elected legislatures, and judges and other courtroom actors
then enforce those rules in a neutral and uniform way. 42 Even if
legislation is inﬂuenced by penal populism, everyday criminal adjudication can at least abide by neutral, orderly processing, treating all defendants equally. In the world of plea bargaining, this means that the
representation of the public by prosecutors becomes especially important—though jurors may sometimes serve as public representatives in
individual cases, 43 juries are rare indeed. 44 Prosecutorial offices can
improve their representation by setting up systems that combine democratic inputs and internal checks and balances. 45 However, once the
41. See Samuel Walker, Popular Justice: A History of American Criminal Justice 5–7
(2d ed. 1998) (describing the “paradox of popular justice,” which “represents the best and
worst of American criminal justice history”); Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic
Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1367, 1371, 1375–77 (2017) [hereinafter Kleinfeld,
Manifesto] (describing a conﬂict among legal scholars between those who focus on
improving criminal justice through bureaucratic professionalization and those who favor
democratization); David Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between Prosecutors and
Democracy in the United States, in Prosecutors and Democracy: A Cross-National Study
276, 276–86 (Maximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds., 2017) [hereinafter Sklansky,
Unpacking the Relationship] (describing the prevalence of this dilemma in the context of
conceptions of the role of prosecutors).
42. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 31–33 (1997) (describing the “Legal Process” conception
of the rule of law); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rev.
781, 809 (1989) (“The point of ‘the Rule of Law, not of individuals’ is that the rules are
supposed to rule. . . . [J]udges [are] . . . merely instrumental functionaries.”).
43. See Jeffrey Abramson, Four Models of Jury Democracy, 90 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 861,
861–73 (2015) (describing different conceptions of how jurors can serve as public
representatives in criminal court).
44. Cf. Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“[C]riminal justice today is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”).
45. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham
L. Rev. 2117, 2123–24 (1998) (describing and defending a vision of the American criminal
justice system in which “the brief formal procedure in court obscures what can be an
invisible, but elaborate and lengthy process of adjudication of the defendant’s guilt”
within the prosecutor’s office). For scholarly discussions of ways to improve the administrative ideal, see, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 798–812
(2005) (emphasizing the importance of institutional design in sentencing commissions,
and suggesting that commissions be placed “in the middle of the political thicket” to
expose inﬂuential actors to the voices of reformers and give the commission notice of the
political viability of its proposals); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration:
Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 Va. L. Rev. 271, 331–41 (2013)
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prosecutor enters the courtroom, a neutral, untainted procedure determines a defendant’s fate. Under this view of procedure, criminal procedure becomes a way to ensure neutral and equal processing of a case after
partisan inputs into systemic priorities. Conversely, any unpredictable or
extrajudicial discretionary moves become interference with the orderly
processing of cases.46
Although this administrative ideal continues to hold sway, a growing
number of scholars and policymakers recognize the decline in public
input into everyday criminal adjudication as a problem, and even a
democratic crisis, and look to democratic processes as a potential answer
to the system’s ills. 47 Whether seen as a problem of legitimacy or
representation, responses from scholars and state actors alike have featured calls to include the “community” in the bureaucracy of criminal
justice in new and novel ways, including through community policing
and community prosecution. These methods of seeking input range
from stakeholder meetings,48 to listening sessions,49 to online notice-and(recommending structural changes within the Department of Justice to eliminate prosecutorial bias); Shima Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1071, 1121–38 (2017) (providing a “blueprint” for ways in which prosecutorial power
can be checked by each of the three branches of government, including within the
Executive Branch).
46. Rachel Barkow connects the focus on neutral processing and reviewable decisionmaking with the rise of the administrative state, which lead scholars and jurists alike to
look down on jury nulliﬁcation, clemency, and other exercises of mercy other than the
prosecutorial decision not to prosecute. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1336–55 (2008).
47. See, e.g., Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice, supra note 4, at 29–58 (describing
contemporary criminal adjudication as “the machinery of criminal justice,” a lawyer-driven
system of pleas without public participation); Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and
Democracy in the Constitutional Law of Punishment, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1437, 1452 (2017)
(arguing that “[p]ushing more criminal justice power . . . down to directly affected
communities and neighborhoods could enhance representativeness and sharpen lines of
authority”); Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1827, 1832–35, 1848 (2015) (advocating for increased democratic inputs into policing
priorities); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause
of Mass Incarceration, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 133, 164–73 (2011) (advocating for improving
democratic criminal justice more broadly through participatory procedures). But see
Dorothy Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist Project, 111 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1597, 1600 (2017) [hereinafter Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law] (arguing that
American systems of law enforcement are by their nature antidemocratic, so that democratizing criminal law requires looking beyond increasing public participation in criminal
justice to considering abolition more broadly). For recent collections of essays on the
themes of democracy and criminal justice, see Democratic Theory and Mass Incarceration
(Albert W. Dzur et al. eds., 2016); Prosecutors and Democracy: A Cross-National Study,
supra note 41; Kleinfeld, Manifesto, supra note 41, at 1370–72 (summarizing symposium
essays on “Democratizing Criminal Justice”).
48. See, e.g., Community Court Stakeholders Meeting Tonight, City of Madison Police
Dep’t (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.cityofmadison.com/police/south/blotter.cfm?Id=6178
[https://perma.cc/79N5-BG7W] (inviting the community to a stakeholder input meeting).
49. See, e.g., Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Listening
Session, http://sanfranciscopolice.org/sites/default/files/USJusticeInitiative/SanFrancisco_
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comment procedures.50 The goal of much “community justice” becomes
to make the representation better : to ﬁx the politics of electing
prosecutors or the internal checks and balances within the executive
branch.51 These “community justice” approaches prioritize consensus,
with the goal of getting the entire “community” in agreement about
prosecutorial or policing priorities at the systemic level. 52 Newer
approaches to improving public participation also tend to focus on systemic inputs—on facilitating ongoing communication between institutional players and the local public. The notable exception is scholars who
call for the creation of juries in which citizens make decisions at moments
other than a verdict, including at a suppression hearing, bail hearing,
plea, or sentencing.53
Community%20Listening%20Session%20Flyer_%20Mission(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/BN7NSXW9] (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) (advertising an open forum intended to improve the
San Francisco Police Department).
50. See, e.g., N.Y. Police Dep’t, NYPD Body-Worn Camera Community Survey, https://
static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/59fb52eb6c31948dfdecbe88/
1509642990544/NYPD-BWC+Paper+Questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/65LE-VEPN]
(last visited Oct. 9, 2018) (describing an online survey designed to solicit comments from
New York City residents on the NYPD’s body camera program).
51. See Todd R. Clear & David R. Karp, The Community Justice Ideal 25 (1999)
(“[The] central focus [of community justice] is community-level outcomes, shifting the
emphasis from individual incidents to systemic patterns . . . .”).
52. See Sklansky, Democracy, supra note 27, at 66–105 (2008) (describing the primacy of seeking consensus in the context of participation and policing); Sklansky,
Unpacking the Relationship, supra note 41, at 282–83, 288–89 (describing the connection
between conceptions of participatory democracy that seek consensus and efforts to promote community prosecution).
53. See, e.g., Appleman, supra note 40, at 91 (calling for lay juries throughout the
adjudication process); Josh Bowers, Upside-Down Juries, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1655, 1671–74
(2017) (calling for “normative” juries at multiple stages of adjudication); Joshua Kleinfeld
et al., White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1693, 1697 (2017)
(“Juries should be included in the criminal justice process whenever reasonably possible,
including at the investigative, charging, trial, and sentencing phases of criminal
procedure.”). For speciﬁc proposals, see Bibas, Machinery of Criminal Justice, supra note
4, at 69–70 (plea juries); Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention,
Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1297, 1363–66 (2012) (bail
juries); Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 Ind. L.J. 731, 750–59 (2010) (plea juries);
Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era
of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 102–16 (2003) (calling for juries to make
some sentencing determinations); Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand
Juries, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 319, 343–49 (2012) (grand juries); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.,
Grand Jury Innovation: Toward a Functional Makeover of the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty,
19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 339, 354–58 (2010) (grand juries that review pleas and
sentencings); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 Va. L. Rev. 311,
312–16 (2003) (sentencing juries); Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 359, 394–99 (2005) (grand and petit juries that review charging,
sentencing, and policymaking decisions); Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 801, 872–78 (2003) (“plea panels”); Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal
Constitution, 65 Ala. L. Rev. 849, 851–56 (2014) (proposing that juries make ﬁndings
regarding constitutional questions in criminal cases). And, in a different vein, R.A. Duff
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But there is another way to approach public participation in the
criminal system. In contrast to the community-justice focus on building
consensus stands a different ideal of public participation: one that promotes agonism rather than consensus as the ideal mode of engagement by
members of the public.54 An agonistic stance toward public participation
in criminal legal institutions would allow groups to participate in the
processes of those institutions while still remaining opposed to the
dominant priorities of the state actors in charge of them.55 If we can
open up our institutions to the ﬂow of agonistic contestation, we might
arrive at a more nuanced account of what is in the best interests of “the
People.”56 In order to do so productively, such paths of critique must
include and even prioritize the voices of those marginalized populations
who are most directly impacted by criminal procedural practices. For it is
the people at the bottom of the “penal pyramid”—defendants, victims,
and their families, friends, and neighbors who come from underresourced neighborhoods57—who are least likely to have the political
and Russell Gold have each proposed on-the-record procedures that would require
prosecutors to account for the impact of their choices on the public. See Antony Duff,
Discretion and Accountability in a Democratic Criminal Law, in Prosecutors and Democracy:
A Cross-National Study, supra note 41, at 9, 9–40 (proposing a new procedure in which
prosecutors are called to account for the effects of their actions on the public); Russell M.
Gold, “Clientless” Prosecutors, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 693, 733–35 (2017) [hereinafter Gold,
Clientless Prosecutors] (proposing that courts appoint amici in individual criminal cases
to represent the public).
54. See Simonson, Copwatching, supra note 25, at 435–37 (arguing for agonism as a
mode of change through contestation that engages with formal democratic processes);
Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 25, at 1612–13 (arguing that bottom-up forms of participation in criminal justice are “crucial for democratic criminal justice” and that such forms of “contestation are not antagonistic, but agonistic”).
55. See Mouffe, Agonistics, supra note 25, at 8–9 (describing agonism as a “real
confrontation [among groups with ideas in opposition to each other], but one that is
played out under conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures accepted by
adversaries”).
56. Cf. Philip Goodman et al., Breaking the Pendulum: The Long Struggle over
Criminal Justice 3, 123–40 (2017) (arguing that the ﬁght over criminal justice in the
United States has long been an agonistic one, in which “actors . . . with varying resources
and differing visions of how to prevent and sanction crime continually contest punishment”); Marie Gottschalk, Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American
Politics 282 (2015) (calling for “convulsive politics from below that we need to dismantle
the carceral state and ameliorate other gaping inequalities”); Lerman & Weaver, supra
note 16, at 236, 236–60 (recommending policy changes to better include those who have
contact with the criminal justice system in democratic processes so as to “walk back the
substantial damage that the [criminal justice] system has done to democracy over the past
ﬁfty years”); Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 405,
408–10 (2018) [hereinafter Akbar, Radical Imagination] (describing the importance of
the critiques created by marginalized groups and emergent social movements); Allegra M.
McLeod, Beyond the Carceral State, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 651, 657 (2017) (book review)
[hereinafter McLeod, Carceral State] (calling for a “broader public reckoning with our
carceral state—informed by the critical insights of impacted communities and experts”).
57. See Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, supra note 29, at 75–90.
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power necessary to voice critiques of the system. 58 It is therefore
especially important to pay attention to existing agonistic forms of public
participation in the very place where people excluded from the political
process interact with institutional players every day: the criminal
courthouse. As the next section demonstrates, while debates over the
ideology of criminal procedure and the ideal nature of public participation in criminal adjudication take place, individuals at the bottom of
the “penal pyramid” are taking public participation into their own hands
by intervening collectively in individual criminal cases. In doing so, they
demonstrate how agonistic contestation can play out in everyday justice.
C.

Communal Participation from Below

Bottom-up agonistic participation in individual criminal cases plays
out in criminal courthouses every day, in phenomena as varied as
community bail funds, courtwatching, and participatory defense. The
tactic of community bail funds exempliﬁes this dynamic. With a community bail fund, groups come together to post bail for strangers and assert
a communal interest in a defendant’s freedom, in contrast to the
assumed communal interest in pretrial detention.59 Bail funds deliberately connect the fate of individual defendants with the fate of neighborhoods and communities, linking these relationships to larger visions of
the (in)justice caused by seemingly neutral procedures. Bail funds
express love and support for strangers—they are not on the side of
defendants as friends or even acquaintances, but rather as members of a
larger social movement in support of decarceration and reinvestment in

58. See Lerman & Weaver, supra note 16, at 139–56 (describing how interacting with
the criminal process affects political engagement); Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal
Justice, supra note 16, at 255 (noting that “voters with the largest stake [in the process of
building and filling prisons]—chiefly African American residents of high-crime city
neighborhoods—had the smallest voice in the relevant decisions”); Monica C. Bell, Police
Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 Yale L.J. 2054, 2067 (2017)
(“[A]t both an interactional and structural level, current regimes can operate to effectively
banish whole communities from the body politic.”); Capers, Good Citizen, supra note 25,
at 654–57 (describing how constitutional criminal procedure doctrine constitutes exclusionary meanings of who is a “good citizen”); Benjamin Justice & Tracey L. Meares, How
the Criminal Justice System Educates Citizens, 651 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 159,
161–73 (2014) (describing how the criminal justice system educates individuals in “anticitizenry”); Natapoff, Speechless, supra note 24, at 1452 (arguing that the silencing of defendants inside the courtroom is part of the “expressive disempowerment of those disadvantaged groups who tend to become defendants”); Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice
System, supra note 24, at 279–85 (describing the criminal justice system’s “anti-democratic
function”).
59. See Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 585, 599–611 (2017)
[hereinafter Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation] (discussing the rise of community bail funds);
Pilar Weiss, Reﬂections on Year One of the National Bail Fund Network (2017) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (reviewing the history of community bail funds as well as
lessons gleaned from the National Bail Fund Network’s coordination of new bail funds).
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poor communities of color.60 Community bail funds now exist in at least
twenty-one states throughout the United States.61 Through the recurring,
performative act of posting bail, these movement actors build power and
shift dominant ideas about the legal meaning of “community” in everyday pretrial procedures, resulting in tangible political and legal change.62
Community bail funds, however, are often met with resistance from
court clerks and other courthouse and jailhouse actors 63 —especially
when they bail out large numbers of people in a short period of time. In
May 2017, for example, nearly two dozen local organizations coordinated
together to bail out more than 100 women and caregivers for Mother’s
Day.64 In the words of Mary Hooks, codirector of Southerners on New
Ground (SONG), who helped conceive, coordinate, and implement this
mass action, this “Mama’s Bail Out Day” was a form of “abolition in the
now” that brings both freedom to individuals and attention to “the slow
deaths of our families and communities.” 65 Some local organizations
involved in the effort, however, encountered resistance when they
attempted to bail out more than one person for Mama’s Bail Out Day,
ﬁnding that clerks, lawyers, wardens, and other corrections officials were
“obstructionist to the farthest extent possible.”66 This on-the-ground
60. Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, supra note 59, at 612–21.
61. See National Bail Fund Network: Directory of Community Bail Funds, Brooklyn
Cmty. Bail Fund, https://brooklynbailfund.org/nbfn-directory [https://perma.cc/R3AUT5XY] (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (listing thirty-two active local community bail funds
across twenty-one states, as well as one national fund and a number of immigration bail or
bond funds).
62. See Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, supra note 59, at 621–31 (describing how community bail funds have led to the reform of bail laws in New York state and have challenged the assumptions underlying constitutional jurisprudence on bail).
63. See id. at 608–10 (describing judicial resistance to bail funds in New York City);
Sells, supra note 20 (describing an advocacy group’s abandonment of efforts to set up a
bail fund program after unnecessary delays by the county court clerk); Demond
Fernandez, Group Working to Post Bail for Inmates Runs into Problems at Dallas Co. Jail,
WFAA (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/group-working-to-post-bailfor-inmates-runs-into-problems-at-dallas-co-jail/287-587438482 [https://perma.cc/24FBY3T9] (recounting Community Bail Fund of North Texas’s complaints that court clerks
gave the group the “run-around” when they attempted to post bail).
64. Jasmine Sanders, ‘If We Let Everybody Go, There’d Be Nobody in Prison’, N.Y.
Times (May 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/13/style/mothers-day-bailout.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Jocelyn Simonson, Opinion, Bail Keeps
These Moms in Jail on Mother’s Day. So Strangers Are Posting It for Them., Wash. Post
(May 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bail-keeps-these-moms-in-jailon-mothers-day-so-strangers-are-posting-it-for-them/2017/05/12/04524d7e-3678-11e7-b373418f6849a004_story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
65. Melissa Gira Grant, Abolition in the Now, Pac. Standard (May 10, 2017),
https://psmag.com/social-justice/home-for-mothers-day [https://perma.cc/BS2F-9PCX].
66. See, e.g., A Labor of Love: Black Mama’s Bail Out Action + Reflection, Southerners
on New Ground (May 16, 2017), http://southernersonnewground.org/2017/05/alabor-of-love/ [https://perma.cc/W7MY-CHMU] (“Wardens, jailers, public defenders,
and solicitors were in SOME sites . . . helpful, supportive and even bent and changed rules
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resistance from state actors demonstrates the ways in which the system
bristles when social-movement interventions disrupt the status quo, even
when they do so via formally established procedures such as the posting
of bail.67 Although state actors are accustomed to family members of
defendants expressing support by posting bail, they resist the idea that a
community group might support a defendant even though members of
the group do not know him or her personally.
Community groups also use the procedural interventions known as
“participatory defense” to intercede directly on behalf of defendants.
With participatory defense, community groups join together with families, friends, neighbors, and allies of defendants to learn about the facts
and procedures of individual cases, perform investigations, present
biographical videos to prosecutors and judges, and pack courtrooms in
support of defendants.68 Participatory defense hubs operate in at least
eighteen jurisdictions throughout the United States.69 At every step, they
aim to connect the stories of individual defendants to larger systemic
injustices, exposing the everyday violence of policing, prosecution, and
incarceration.70 Although the goal of participatory defense at any one
moment might be to help free an individual defendant, ultimately the
aim of the practice is nothing less than an end to mass incarceration
through “chang[ing] the landscape of power . . . in the criminal justice
system.”71 This means that a participatory defense group attending a “justice hub meeting” will applaud and congratulate a teenager recently
released from custody, even though they have never met him before;72
to help us. But in other places, they were completely obstructionist to the farthest extent
possible.”).
67. Local governments have sometimes embraced bail funds, for example in New
York City, St. Louis, and Connecticut, all of which have proposed or implemented state- or
city-funded bail funds. But these efforts, in shifting to a model of representation, have
watered down both the participatory potential and the impact of the bail fund model. See
Jocelyn Simonson, When the City Posts Bail 13–16 (July 2016) (unpublished manuscript)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Simonson, When the City Posts Bail].
68. See Janet Moore et al., Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the
Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 Alb. L. Rev. 1281, 1285–86 (2015) (describing the
participatory defense movement and its power); Liana Pennington, An Empirical Study of
One Participatory Defense Program Facilitated by a Public Defender Office, 14 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 603, 606–10 (2017) (documenting the recent growth of the participatory defense
movement).
69. ACJPDEBUG, Participatory Defense Launches in Philadelphia, Albert Cobarrubias
Just. Project (Dec. 12, 2017), https://acjusticeproject.org/2017/12/12/participatorydefense-launches-in-philadelphia/ [https://perma.cc/GM2Q-ACQ5] (stating that, with
the launch of the Philadelphia participatory defense project in 2017, there are now
eighteen participatory defense sites in the National Network for Participatory Defense).
70. Cf. Cover, Violence, supra note 22, at 1608 (connecting a recognition of the violence of the law with a respect for the experience of defendants and prisoners).
71. See Robin Yeamans, Fighting for Justice by Court Watching, People’s Trib.,
http://www.peoplestribune.org/PT.2012.05/PT.2012.05.11.shtml [https://perma.cc/52N3NZ5D] (last visited Oct. 5, 2018).
72. Moore et al., supra note 68, at 1283–84.
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and a campaign to free an incarcerated black woman will work not only
to humanize that particular woman but also “to challenge false and
damaging binaries that we use to describe incarcerated people, like violent/non-violent and innocent/guilty.”73 Although participatory defense
campaigns may cooperate with public defenders or defense attorneys,
lawyers are never the center of any one effort.74 Instead, the wisdom and
energy of marginalized groups who do not ordinarily have a say in the
justice process are centered in collective efforts to support defendants,
shift power, and create new visions of community.75 But, like community
bail funds, the tactics that make up participatory defense have met obstacles, both formal and cultural, at every step.76
Collective forms of intervention in everyday adjudication also happen through observation inside the courtroom. Some community groups
participate in efforts at courtwatching, not to support an individual
defendant but rather to voice opposition to larger prosecutorial policies
and practices, or to collect information so as to hold prosecutors
accountable.77 Courtwatching groups affiliated with larger social movements, for example, gather volunteers to document everyday proceedings in local courts—bond hearings, arraignments, pleas—and report to
the public the results of their observations. These community groups
become self-appointed watchdogs who can present the results of their
observations in their own words, on their own terms, and independent of
official accounts of policies.78 Courtwatchers not only hold courtroom
actors accountable, they also shift the power dynamics within the courtroom, reminding institutional players of the larger public dimensions of
individual cases.79
73. Kaba, Free Us All, supra note 10.
74. Moore et al., supra note 68, at 1283.
75. Id.
76. See Cynthia Godsoe, Participatory Defense: Humanizing the Accused and Ceding
Control to the Client, 69 Mercer L. Rev. 715, 716–18 (2018) (describing the history of
public defender resistance to participatory defense but noting that this is changing as the
practice becomes more established).
77. See generally Bryce Covert, The Court Watch Movement Wants to Expose the
“House of Cards,” Appeal (July 16, 2018), https://theappeal.org/court-watch-accountabilitymovement/ [https://perma.cc/RJ9E-Z5VJ] (describing the recent rise of “mission-driven
court watch”).
78. For examples of this at work, see, e.g., id.; 8 Week Court Watching Project!!,
Cmty. Renewal Soc’y, http://www.communityrenewalsociety.org/calendar/8-week-courtwatching-project [https://perma.cc/9MEF-LKMQ] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
79. See Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Representing Justice: Invention, Controversy,
and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms 300–02 (2011) (describing how
audience members in courtrooms help deﬁne the meaning of proceedings); Jocelyn
Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 2173,
2184–90 (2014) [hereinafter Simonson, Audience] (describing the power shifts that occur
through the act of observation inside a courtroom); Covert, supra note 77 (quoting a
Court Watch NYC activist and describing the purpose of courtwatching as, in part, “shifting power”).
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Activists engaging with criminal adjudication through participatory
defense, community bail funds, courtwatching, or any number of other
collective interventions into everyday justice see themselves as trying to
move the criminal legal system toward something that is more responsive
to the local communities it claims to serve. The exploration of the ideology of criminal procedure in this Essay is indebted to the work of these
contemporary movement activists to shift the discourse surrounding the
interactions of power, structure, and community in criminal law and
policy reform.80 In the remainder of this Essay, I examine the facets of
our ideology of criminal procedure that cause the system to resist these
bottom-up interventions into everyday criminal adjudication. In the next
Part, I attempt to set out what I see as the reigning ideology of procedure
with respect to popular participation: that the general public belongs on
the side of the police and the prosecution, and not on the side of defendants. This ideology facilitates the resistance of state actors to forms of
agonistic participation with the greatest potential to shift the status quo
in criminal adjudication.
II. THE PEOPLE/DEFENDANT DICHOTOMY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In our dominant contemporary conception of criminal procedure,
the place of the public—“the People”—is on the side of the police and
the prosecution, in an act of communal condemnation. From there, the
familiar approach to crafting criminal procedure depends on the idea
that police officers and prosecutors, or “the People,” should act and
speak as representatives of the local community. This ideal of communal
representation, in turn, dictates how we approach procedural innovations. If the ideal of representation is undermined—if the state is not
adequately channeling popular will—then procedures can shift to seek
out ways of gathering input to make police and prosecutors more responsive to the community. This is the heart of many contemporary criminal
adjudication reforms that seek to craft new procedures in the name of
“community justice.” At the same time, each defendant is in need of
protection in the face of the communal suspicion that state actors
personify. If the defendant does not have adequate protections against
state power, the answer is to strengthen individual procedural protections
through individual rights and resources. On each side, our channels of
remedying injustices in the system strengthen the dichotomy between
“the People” and the person whom the people suspect of wrongdoing. In
this Part, I lay out the basic contours of this ideology and argue that it
80. Cf. Amna A. Akbar, Law’s Exposure: The Movement and the Legal Academy, 65 J.
Legal Educ. 352, 355–56 (2015) (describing the importance of studying the visions and
critiques created by marginalized groups and emergent social movements); Janet Moore,
Decarceral Constitutionalism 39–43 (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Moore, Decarceral Constitutionalism] (arguing that we should
bring grassroots interventions in criminal justice into our analyses of popular
constitutionalism).
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carries with it a distinct set of problems: one, an undue focus on prosecutors as representatives of the public will; and two, an illusory conception
of a “neutral” public that is both disinterested and decorous. Taken
together, the ideology of the people/defendant dichotomy serves to
exclude marginalized populations from paths of participation in criminal
procedure and legitimize overly punitive outcomes in individual cases.
A.

The People v. the Defendant: Mapping the Dichotomy

Dominant conceptions of the criminal process largely presuppose a
clean separation between the interests of the public and the interests of
the defendant, which are assumed to be in direct opposition to each
other. The people/defendant dichotomy is especially pronounced in the
realm of adjudication, after a prosecutor decides to ﬁle charges, thereby
designating a member of the public a “defendant.” This dichotomy plays
out at multiple levels: in prosecutorial identity as representing “the
People,” in the constitutional jurisprudence of individual procedural
rights, and in the policies and cultures of local courthouses. And the
dichotomy is echoed in much of the scholarship that examines ideology
and criminal procedure: Herbert Packer, for example, assumed an
adversarial system in which the defendant stands alone, with only defense
counsel and formal rules and requirements to help her along the way.81
As John Griffiths explained in his critique of Packer nearly ﬁfty years ago,
this assumption continually sets things up as a battle, a “stylized war”
between “the Individual (particularly the accused individual) and the
State.”82 On one side of the battle is a lone defendant, and on the other
are “the People.”83 This theme recurs throughout the practices, rules,
and jurisprudence structuring criminal procedure: The debate is over
how to structure this battle between “the People,” represented by a

81. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text (describing this aspect of Packer’s
ideas); see also Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Street Crime 26–27 (1991) (arguing
that both of Packer’s models center on the treatment of an individual and therefore direct
attention “toward the fate of formally anonymous defendants and away from their broader
social identities and circumstances”); Roach, supra note 29, at 672 (arguing that Packer’s
models do not account for the different ways in which victims can intervene in the
process).
82. Griffiths, supra note 29, at 367.
83. This idealized battle certainly predated Herbert Packer, emerging as early as the
nineteenth century. See Herman W. Chaplin, Reform in Criminal Procedure, 7 Harv. L.
Rev. 189, 199–200 (1893) (describing a shift in the late nineteenth century toward an idea
of a prosecution as “the contest . . . between the public and the accused”). Notably,
Chaplin identiﬁed this as a problem: “We ought now to be ready for the theory that a
criminal prosecution is not a contest at all, but an investigation, conducted by the State,
before a tribunal of its own appointment . . . .” Id. at 199. Thanks to Alice Ristroph for
pointing me to Chaplin’s work.
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prosecutor, and the defendant, rather than about whether the battle
lines should be drawn in those ways at all.84
When the public is situated as a force opposed to the defendant,
prosecutors become the central representatives of the public in the
courthouse. Prosecutors are “ministers of justice,” 85 representing the
sovereign and its citizens, and must act in the interests of their client, the
state.86 This aspect of the prosecutorial identity—as a servant of the
public—is but one of the multifaceted identities that prosecutors
possess;87 and the prosecutor’s duty to the public does not supplant her
duty to the rule of law or even to an independent sense of justice.88 But
implicit in the prosecutorial identity as a public servant is the idea that
84. One important exception to this trend is the theory and practices of restorative
justice, which often try to bridge the gap between the defendant and the community by
bringing the two into conversation. Even there, however, the defendant is assumed to have
done wrong and prosecution is assumed to be the right approach. See generally John
Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989) (laying out a comprehensive theory
of restorative justice).
85. Lissa Griffin & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration, 30
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 301, 304 (2017) (“[I]t is well accepted that the prosecutor is a ﬁduciary who represents the sovereign and must make decisions for society at large . . . .”); see
also Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1447, 1451–53
(2016) [hereinafter Levine, Prosecuting Police] (“[P]rosecutors have the well-known duty
to ‘seek justice’ . . . .” (quoting Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-1.1(c) (Am. Bar Ass’n
1986))).
86. Griffin & Yaroshefsky, supra note 85, at 311–15; see also Bruce A. Green, Why
Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 607, 634–37 (1999) (arguing
that the best justiﬁcation for the prosecutorial duty to seek justice is representing the
sovereign’s interest in “ensuring fairness of the process”).
87. One recent study of state prosecutors from nine different offices identiﬁed four
principal career motivations for working state prosecutors: “reinforcing one’s core absolutist identity, gaining trial skills, performing a valuable public service, and sustaining a worklife balance.” See Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Getting Beyond Superheroes Versus
Trojan Horses: Career Motivations of State Court Prosecutors 4–5 (Aug. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3021429 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review); see also Maximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky, Epilogue: Prosecutors and
Democracy—Themes and Counterthemes, in Prosecutors and Democracy: A CrossNational Study, supra note 41, at 300, 302–08 (describing “prosecutors as agents of the
popular will” as one of four main conceptions of the relationship between prosecutors and
democracy). But even the demand of “neutrality” and obedience to the rule of law is
guided by the wishes of the public. For instance, Bruce Green & Fred Zacharias have
argued that the concept of prosecutorial neutrality is best described by the idea that
“prosecutors should make decisions based on articulable principles or subprinciples that
command broad societal acceptance.” Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial
Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 837, 840.
88. See David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 473, 519 (2016) (describing how prosecutors must mediate
between “democratic responsiveness” on the one hand and “detached objectivity” on the
other). And, moreover, once the decision to prosecute has been made, the goal is to win
the case via a plea or a guilty verdict at trial. See John Langbein, The Origins of Adversary
Criminal Trial 332–34 (2003) (describing how during the ascendance of the adversary
criminal trial, prosecutors became “partisans whose interest is in winning, not in truth”).
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they are the institutional actors who channel the will of the people into
adjudication. This is how prosecutors are able to call themselves “the
People” in many states. Although judges and even public defenders are
sometimes elected,89 it is the prosecutors who represent the people. Not
only that, they represent the community, in the sense of a local public
with common concerns; they speak for us all.90 This leaves the other
side—the defendant—as a solitary individual in need of the support of
counsel and the protection of the Constitution.91
I do not mean to minimize the importance of the criminal jury as an
institution of public participation and representation. In the tiny subset
of cases in which juries adjudicate guilt and innocence after a full-blown
trial,92 members of the public do indeed have important roles as citizens
and judges.93 This is the top of the “penal pyramid,” where cases are
either adjudicated before juries or plea bargains genuinely happen in the
shadow of potential jury decisions.94 But this is not the reality for the vast
majority of cases in criminal court, for which “[t]rials are nearly extinct
and their shadows weak.”95 Given this post-trial landscape, our contemporary ideology of criminal adjudication has internalized the reality that we
have a “system of pleas, not a system of trials,”96 such that prosecutors are
89. See generally David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 Colum. L. Rev.
265 (2008) (arguing that a rise in the legitimacy of judicial elections undermines the
distinctive role of the judiciary); Ronald F. Wright, Public Defender Elections and Popular
Control over Criminal Justice, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 803 (2010) (describing the three states that
hold elections for public defenders).
90. See Michelle Madden Dempsey, Prosecuting Domestic Violence 48–52 (2009)
(describing the difference between the prosecutorial claim to act on behalf of the state and
the prosecutorial claim to act on behalf of the community). I return to this distinction in
Part III.
91. See Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 Yale
L.J. 2176, 2195–96 (2013) [hereinafter Butler, Poor People Lose] (critiquing the “isolated
individualism” of Gideon and the right to counsel); David Alan Sklansky, Autonomy and
Agency in American Criminal Process 1 (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 2849226,
2016) [hereinafter Sklansky, Autonomy], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2849226 (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (describing the assumption underlying American criminal
procedure that “fairness is best advanced through a series of procedural rights that defendants can invoke or waive at their discretion”).
92. See Suja A. Thomas, What Happened to the American Jury? Proposals for
Revamping Plea Bargaining and Summary Judgment, Litig., Spring 2017, at 25, 25
(“[J]uries today decide only 1–4 percent of criminal cases filed in federal and state court.”).
93. See generally Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of
Democracy 1–13 (1994) (“No other institution of government rivals the jury in placing
power so directly in the hands of citizens.”); Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American
Jury 3–11 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1966) (“The jury . . . represents a deep commitment
to the use of laymen in the administration of justice . . . .”).
94. See Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, supra note 29, at 71–82.
95. Id. at 78; see also Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial,
117 Harv. L. Rev. 2464, 2466–68 (2004) (questioning the impact of the “shadows of trial”
on plea bargaining outcomes).
96. Laﬂer v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012).
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able to assume their place as public representatives seeking justice on
behalf of “the People.” Moreover, even when juries do deliberate and
decide the fate of individual defendants, we select individual jurors amid
an illusory ideal of neutrality that leans toward the exclusion of members
of the public who might side with the interests of the defendant.97
The dichotomy between “the People” and the defendant is echoed
in constitutional jurisprudence as well. The emphasis on individual rights
of defendants inside the courtroom is based, at its heart, on the classiﬁcation of a lone defendant faced with communal suspicion. The reigning
assumption is that protecting individual autonomy through constitutional rights and procedures can in turn protect fairness.98 On the one
hand, protection of an autonomous defendant is said to reinforce fairness and due process, and on the other hand, the public is assumed to be
a force of condemnation pushing against this autonomous defendant.
This leads to a constitutional jurisprudence that assumes that the weight
of the public interest is on the side of the prosecution. For example, in
the leading Supreme Court case on pretrial detention, United States v.
Salerno, the Court explicitly describes a defendant’s interest in liberty and
the community’s interest in safety as two sides of a scale of justice that a
judge must weigh against each other.99 This theme recurs throughout
constitutional criminal procedure, from the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel,100 to the Fifth Amendment right to not be subject to double
jeopardy,101 to the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
seizure.102
The assumption that the public’s interest and the defendant’s interest are in direct opposition to each other in turn affects a central calculus
that courts must often make in constitutional criminal procedure: a
balancing test between the prosecution’s interest in community safety
(representing the interest of the public) and the defendant’s individual
97. See infra notes 145–151 and accompanying text.
98. See Sklansky, Autonomy, supra note 91, at 1 (showing how these ideas are
reﬂected in rules of waiver and effective assistance of counsel); Robert E. Toone, The
Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 621, 623–40 (2005) (arguing that
the reliance on defendant autonomy in constitutional criminal procedure is incoherent
and harmful); cf. Dolovich, supra note 27, at 264–65 (“The sustaining discourse of this
penal system is a radically individualist one that locates the causes of crime exclusively in
the free and conscious choice of the offenders themselves.”).
99. 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (“On the other side of the scale, of course, is the
individual’s strong interest in liberty.”).
100. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 25 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he trial
judge has an obligation to . . . balance the defendant’s interest against the public’s interest
in the efficient and expeditious administration of criminal justice.”).
101. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (contrasting the “defendant’s interests” with “the public’s interest in fair trials” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949))).
102. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 23 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (describing
the Court’s “balancing of the interests of the suspect and the public interest in effective
law enforcement”).
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liberty interest (representing one lone defendant).103 When the interests
of the community are assumed to be on the side of the prosecution, the
court’s calculation of costs and beneﬁts fails to include the interests of
the community that align with defendants. There is no recognition, for
example, that members of a community might have an interest in the
defendant’s liberty or share the defendant’s understanding of what a fair
trial entails;104 instead, the weight of the entire community is against the
interests of the defendant. This skews the results of constitutional balancing tests in favor of the prosecution.105
To be sure, constitutional jurisprudence recognizes that enforcing
some rights can beneﬁt both a defendant and other members of the public. For example, enforcing the exclusionary rule for violations of the
Fourth or Fifth Amendments in individual cases can deter police misconduct in other instances,106 and prohibiting the exclusion of jurors because
of race or gender beneﬁts potential jurors in addition to defendants.107
The idea that one defendant may act as a kind of “private attorney
general” in a suppression hearing squarely recognizes that the public
and the defendant have shared interests in constitutional police conduct.108 The Fourth Amendment, in particular, explicitly protects “the
people” rather than a single “person” or “accused” as in the Fifth and
103. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law
in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943, 981 (1987) (describing how “[b]alancing opinions
typically pit individual against governmental interests”); Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing
the Fourth Amendment, 102 Geo. L.J. 1, 15–17 (2013) (describing a range of constitutional criminal doctrines in which courts balance the interests of the government in public
safety against the interests of the defendant).
104. For accounts of the harms to the public of pretrial detention, see Shima
Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. Rev. 1, 5–7 (2017) [hereinafter Baughman, Pretrial Detention] (describing the social and communal harms of pretrial
detention); Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, supra note 59, at 599–612 (describing how
community bail funds demonstrate that incarcerating defendants before trial harms their
families, neighborhoods, and communities); Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail
System, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1399, 1423–29 (2017) (describing harms to the public of pretrial
detention).
105. See, e.g., Baradaran, supra note 103, at 14–19 (discussing these skewed results in
the context of the Fourth Amendment balancing test).
106. See id. at 15–17; Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law
Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 Colum.
L. Rev. 247, 267–74 (1988) (“The fourth amendment’s exclusionary rule . . . serves only to
deter the police from engaging in illegal searches in the future and thereby from violating
the rights of others . . . .”); William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 Va.
L. Rev. 761, 779–83 (1989) [hereinafter Stuntz, Waiving Rights] (describing when individual rights in criminal procedure serve larger interests).
107. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (“The harm from discriminatory
jury selection extends beyond that inﬂicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to
touch the entire community.”).
108. See Meltzer, supra note 106, at 249 (describing how a defendant can function as a
“private attorney general” when seeking suppression of evidence because she deters
government misconduct on behalf of the public).
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Sixth Amendments.109 The Supreme Court has stressed the signiﬁcance
of this distinction, which implies a common interest between all “the
people,” including defendants, in protection from unnecessary state
interference.110
But while this strand of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does
indeed imply that defendants are part of a broader “people,” a “national
community,”111 the context of adjudicatory procedure does not support
the inverse idea, that the “people” support the defendant. In the courtroom context—a suppression hearing for a Fourth or Fifth Amendment
violation—the idea is that a defendant may help the larger public of people similarly situated, not that the national community stands on the side
of the defendant.112 Or, as Bill Stuntz describes it, the exclusionary remedy exists as “protection extended to the guilty primarily as a means of
protecting the innocent.”113 The public’s interest is not in the freedom of
the defendant but in the constitutional treatment of other “law-abiding”
members of the public.114 Indeed, the doctrines structuring interactions
between the police and the public themselves construct a separation
between “good” and “bad” members of the public. 115 The people/defendant dichotomy remains.
Even the constitutional doctrines that would seem to provide a place
for public input beyond the prosecution—the jury-trial right and the
right to a public trial—tend to reinforce the sense that the appropriate
community input in adjudication is that which stands with the prosecution, or at least is not “biased” against the prosecution. Although the
Sixth Amendment guarantees that a jury be drawn from a fair cross-section of the local community, in practice the demand for neutral and
109. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264–66 (1990) (declaring
the signiﬁcance of this distinction).
110. See id. But see District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 625–26 (2008) (limiting the operative meaning of “the People” to “law-abiding citizens”); see also Pratheepan
Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear
Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1521, 1530–31 (2010) (discussing the implications of Heller’s deﬁnition of “the People”); Note, The Meaning(s) of “the People” in the Constitution, 126
Harv. L. Rev. 1078, 1078–86 (2013) (describing the conflict between inclusive and exclusive
notions of “the People” in Verdugo-Urquidez and Heller).
111. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
112. Cf. Meltzer, supra note 106, at 280–81 (describing a suppression hearing as an
“assertion of the rights of others”).
113. Stuntz, Waiving Rights, supra note 106, at 766.
114. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
115. See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of
Criminal Justice Reform, 104 Geo. L.J. 1419, 1447 (2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court ha[s]
established a set of police practices that, in theory, apply to everyone, but are principally
directed against black men.”); Capers, Good Citizen, supra note 25, at 654–57 (detailing
how the “good citizen” is one who is willing to cooperate with the police, at times willingly
waiving his rights); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich. L.
Rev. 946, 1006–11 (2002) [hereinafter Carbado, Fourth Amendment] (critiquing a racialized concept of innocence in Fourth Amendment doctrine).
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disinterested jurors weeds out many jurors who might tend to side with
defendants. For example, we comfortably exclude from juries not only
potential jurors with criminal convictions116 but also those who have a
history of being arrested or charged with crimes,117 or whose family members have experience with the criminal legal system.118 And although jury
nulliﬁcation is a powerful tool that juries can use to check prosecutorial
power, it is a hidden power, and jurors who admit they might nullify are
excluded from serving. 119 Jury nulliﬁcation, of course, may directly
controvert some conceptions of the rule of law.120 So, too, might the
elimination of another doctrine that epitomizes the idea of a jury primed
to side with the prosecution: the requirement that jurors in death penalty
cases be “death-qualified.”121 But these doctrines defining the composition
116. See Kalt, supra note 21, at 67 (describing how the majority of states and the federal government exclude individuals with felony records from jury service); see also Anna
Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 98 Minn.
L. Rev. 592, 605 (2013) (“To exclude from jury service those with criminal convictions is to
remove a certain type of experience from the jury . . . .”).
117. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking, supra note 21, at 1403–07 (describing how
peremptory strikes of potential jurors of color because of their experience with policing is
generally a “safe haven” under Batson).
118. Id. at 1403–04.
119. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[W]hat is
tolerable or even desirable as an informal, self-initiated exception [of nulliﬁcation], harbors grave dangers to the system if it is . . . incorporat[ed] in the judge’s instruction.”);
Paul Butler, Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice 67–68 (2009) [hereinafter Butler,
Hip-Hop Theory of Justice] (describing nulliﬁcation as a “secret power of jurors”).
120. See Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nulliﬁcation Within the Rule of Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev.
1149, 1150–52 (1997) (describing ways in which jury nulliﬁcation may subvert the rule of
law but is necessary to ensure justice); Jenny E. Carroll, Nulliﬁcation as Law, 102 Geo. L.J.
579, 609–21 (2014) [hereinafter Carroll, Nulliﬁcation] (discussing different conceptions
of jury nulliﬁcation in relation to the rule of law).
121. Jurors in death penalty cases must state that they would be willing to impose the
death penalty, so as to weed out those who are “unable to decide a capital defendant’s
guilt or innocence fairly and impartially.” See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 172
(1986); see also id. at 176 (“[T]hose who ﬁrmly believe that the death penalty is unjust
may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are
willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.”);
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 516–18 (1968) (refusing to declare the practice of
death-qualifying juries unconstitutional, despite evidence that death-qualiﬁed juries will be
predisposed to favor the prosecution). A number of scholars have documented how this
requirement of death-qualiﬁed juries biases juries in favor of the prosecution. See, e.g.,
Claudia L. Cowan et al., The Effects of Death Qualiﬁcation on Jurors’ Predisposition to
Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 Law & Hum. Behav. 53, 67–68 (1984);
Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital
Cases, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 469, 494–95 (1996); George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a
“Death Qualiﬁed” Jury on the Guilty Determination Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 567, 582–85
(1971). Moreover, death qualiﬁcation skews the racial composition of juries. See Aliza
Plener Cover, The Eighth Amendment’s Lost Jurors: Death Qualiﬁcation and Evolving
Standards of Decency, 92 Ind. L.J. 113, 118 (2016) (presenting evidence that in seven trials
in Louisiana, more than one-third of African Americans were struck from capital juries on
the basis of their opposition to the death penalty); J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic
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of “unbiased” juries exemplify a conception of criminal procedure that
deﬁnes “bias” as the tendency to side with defendants.
The separation between the people and the defendant is also at
work in efforts to seek popular input into the criminal process in new
ways outside of the courthouse, especially through methods of “community justice.” Community prosecution and community policing may be
promising ways to expand the number of voices who have input into
policing and prosecution priorities.122 But even when these processes
expand to better capture communal sentiment in local criminal law, they
continue to do so by assuming that the community (including victims) is
on the side of policing or prosecution. They rarely encourage or incorporate critique, and may instead have the tendency to mute any voices that
seek to challenge the status quo.123 They rarely ask how to facilitate
communal support of those subject to surveillance, arrest, prosecution,
and punishment.124 And they rarely look to the ways in which marginalized
Dilemma in Death Qualiﬁcation of Capital Jurors, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1107, 1168–69
(2014) (“[T]he death-qualiﬁcation process . . . serves to reduce the black presence in a
symbolically important process in the criminal justice system.”).
122. For descriptions of how community prosecution works, see, e.g., Anthony V.
Alﬁeri, Community Prosecutors, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 1465, 1466 (2002); Levine, Prosecuting
Police, supra note 85, at 1492–93; Anthony Thompson, It Takes a Community to
Prosecute, 77 Notre Dame L. Rev. 321, 360–71 (2002) [hereinafter Thompson, It Takes a
Community]; Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. Rev. 593, 609–10
(2014).
123. See Sklansky, Democracy, supra note 27, at 114–32 (critiquing the community
policing paradigm, in part for its tendency to mute critical or oppositional voices);
Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 17, at 217 (“Far from serving the needs of the disadvantaged, the concept of community can, in the wrong hands, become another weapon
for perpetuating the disempowerment and discrimination that continue to haunt urban
America.”); Stephen D. Mastrofski & Jack R. Greene, Community Policing and the Rule of
Law, in Police Innovation and Control of the Police: Problems of Law, Order, and
Community 80, 92–93 (David Weisburd & Craig Uchida eds., 1993) (discussing “the challenge of stimulating actual community voice rather than achieving cooptation” that arises
from community policing); M. Alexander Pearl, Of “Texans” and “Custers”: Maximizing
Welfare and Efficiency Through Informal Norms, 19 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 32, 47–48
(2014) (arguing that community policing imposes norms on the community that are
“fundamentally external and foreign to the community,” even if they are “executed by
various members of the community”); Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence,
64 UCLA L. Rev. 1182, 1223–25 (2017) [hereinafter Ristroph, Constitution of Police
Violence] (describing the “scholarly veneration of compliance” in respect to community
policing and procedural justice); Simonson, Copwatching, supra note 25, at 405 (describing
how the consensus-based efforts at community justice reinscribe existing power imbalances).
124. See James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1, 14–16, 19–21 (2004) (describing studies of the uneven inclusion of populations with little political power in community policing, especially poor people of color and
young people); Wesley G. Skogan, Representing the Community in Community Policing,
in Community Policing: Can It Work? 57, 57 (Wesley G. Skogan ed., 2004) (describing how
attendance at beat meetings in Chicago represents “a strong middle-class bias” and
“do[es] a better job at representing already established stakeholders in the community
than [it] do[es] at integrating marginalized groups with fewer mechanisms for voicing
their concerns”). Even well-meaning prosecutors and police officers will tend to hear the
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populations are already intervening at moments that are technically
“procedural” but when added up constitute the heart of the criminal
adjudication experience.
A conception of criminal procedure that places the public in direct
opposition to defendants and arrestees is problematic for a number of
reasons. To begin with, it is descriptively inaccurate. Pairing “the People”
with the people discounts the array of ways in which marginalized groups
living in the shadow of the carceral state intervene in the criminal process on behalf of defendants and those targeted by the police.125 Police
and courts often meet these bottom-up participatory tactics with resistance, arguing that they undermine the rule of law and disrupt the decorum of everyday justice. For example, police arrest organized copwatchers for ﬁlming, administrators close courtrooms to spectators, and judges
order the closure of community bail funds.126 This state resistance to
participation on behalf of defendants is made possible by the people/defendant dichotomy, which limits the ways in which we balance and
reform our current procedures. Below I ﬂesh out two particular facets of
the people/defendant dichotomy that serve to legitimize the exclusion of
marginalized populations from everyday adjudication: the representation
problem and the neutrality problem.
B.

The Representation Problem

The idea that the public stands on the side of everyday prosecutions
allows the criminal process to channel public participation in everyday
adjudication through the public’s representatives, most prominently line
prosecutors. The problem with the ideology of representation is not the
concept that prosecutors represent the interests of some public—surely
they do. Rather, the problematic assumption underlying the representation ideal is that prosecutors represent the interests of the entire community. Describing prosecutors and police as representatives of “the People”
as one entity assumes that our current methods of seeking public input
into criminal justice are capable of accurately channeling public sentiment. This assumption is not only false, it is harmful; it allows the process
to exclude those who would try to participate in other ways. The result of
opinions with which they agree, moving toward a “consensus” that reﬂects more their
starting point than a compromise position. See Steve Herbert, Citizens, Cops, and Power:
Recognizing the Limits of Community 72–73 (2006) (ﬁnding that police constitute their
own view of community and “recognize some and not other forms of input as legitimate”);
Sklansky, Democracy, supra note 27, at 114–20 (describing how some forms of community
policing mute “dissident values” that diverge from the status quo); id. at 289
(“‘Community prosecution’ and ‘neighborhood prosecution’ often wind up being . . .
efforts to decentralize the location and focus of prosecutors, but not to decentralize political
oversight.”).
125. See supra section I.C.
126. Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice, supra note 25, at 1622. For a description of these forms of resistance by state actors, see id. at 1617–21.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273565

280

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 119:249

the ideology of representation, then, is that marginalized groups are doubly excluded: They are excluded from the participation that does happen, and their own bottom-up participation is discounted as illegitimate.
Prosecutors have deeply entrenched identities as conduits for the
public will for justice—as representatives of the public. This prosecutorial
identity as a representative of the local public is exempliﬁed by a
prosecutor calling herself “the People” in court, but it is not dependent
on this label. Nor is it solely about being elected by the populace. As
Attorney General Jeff Sessions, himself an appointed rather than elected
prosecutor, told a room of state and local prosecutors: “As a prosecutor,
you have the honor of representing your community in court. I will never
forget the feeling of going before a judge and saying, ‘the United States
is ready.’ I will never get over that feeling . . . . I’m sure you feel the same
way.”127 With respect to prosecutions, the idea of representation can
mean either that prosecutors are making decisions that reﬂect the priorities of the public (they are “descriptive” representatives), or that prosecutors have been fairly selected and given authority to make the decisions
that they feel are just (they are “acting for” the public based on their own
ideas of justice). 128 Either way, the ideal of representation serves to
cement the idea of the prosecutor as a conduit for the public interest.
This concept of public prosecutors as representatives channeling public
sentiment arose in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as public
prosecutors gradually supplanted private parties as initiators of criminal
prosecutions in the United States, 129 with the role of defending the
“peace and dignity of the state” by publicly prosecuting wrongdoers.130
The resulting concept of public prosecution was that “society as a whole
[is] the ultimate victim” of crime, and the role of prosecutors is to represent society in condemning that crime; in this sense, prosecutors are the
people.131
127. Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks to the National District
Attorneys Association (July 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-generaljeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-national-district-attorneys-association [https://perma.cc/KAW43J5W]. But see Laurie L. Levenson, Conﬂicts over Conﬂicts: Challenges in Redrafting the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on Conﬂicts of Interest, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 879,
885 (2011) (“Although most prosecutors appreciate on some intellectual level that they
represent the ‘People’ or ‘Government’ or the community-at-large, on a day-to-day basis,
they answer only to themselves or to a supervisor.” (footnote omitted)).
128. See generally Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 60–92,
112–42 (1967) (describing these different concepts of representation and functions of
representatives).
129. For a summary of the history of public prosecution in the United States, see Joan
E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity 7–36 (1980); John D. Bessler,
The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 511,
516–21 (1994); Eric S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 1419, 1435–40
(2018).
130. Jacoby, supra note 129, at 10 (quoting the 1796 Vermont Constitution).
131. Id. at 10. Historians disagree as to whether this shift to prosecution by public
representatives constituted an effort to democratize criminal justice by moving beyond
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The ideal of prosecutorial representation has a baseline faulty assumption: that popular input happens, and happens well. The dichotomy
between the people and the defendant assumes that because prosecutors
and police chiefs are often elected, they are able to transform public
sentiment into legal action. However, while prosecutorial and policing
decisions surely reﬂect some popular sentiment, and possibly even the
majority view of justice, 132 studies have continually shown that they
usually do not reﬂect the input of the most marginalized voices, who
either are ineligible to vote or come from neighborhoods whose political
power has been undermined by mass incarceration.133 This is in large
part a consequence of the broad reach of the criminal legal system itself,
which not only disenfranchises large numbers of people with criminal
records or in state custody but also drains political power from entire

private power, or an effort to expand the reach of the criminal law by allowing prosecution
for victimless crimes. Compare, e.g., id. at 10–11 (describing the shift to public prosecution as a reaction to inequities), with Allen Steinberg, The Transformation of Criminal
Justice: Philadelphia, 1800–1880, at 119–49 (1989) (describing the rise of public prosecution in Philadelphia as a reaction to disorder and a desire to prosecute victimless crimes).
132. But see Jazmine Ulloa, ACLU Campaign Highlights the Positions of California
District Attorneys on Crime and Punishment Ballot Measures, L.A. Times (Aug. 22, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-aclu-targetscalifornia-district-1503370121-htmlstory.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(describing the disconnect between public opinion polls and opinions of elected district
attorneys in California).
133. See Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Imprisonment: How the Democratic Process
Shapes the Way America Punishes Offenders 12 (2009) (arguing that punitive policies
coincide with electorates dominated by elite social groups); Traci Burch, supra note 16, at
75–77 (“People who live in high-imprisonment neighborhoods vote less than people who
live in neighborhoods with fewer prisoners . . . [and] are less active in politics . . . .”);
Lerman & Weaver, supra note 16, at 199–202 (explaining the impact of the stigma of
imprisonment on an individual’s likelihood to participate in political institutions); Lisa L.
Miller, The Myth of Mob Rule: Violent Crime and Democratic Politics 9 (2016) [hereinafter Miller, Mob Rule] (arguing that high levels of imprisonment can be explained in part
by a “democratic deﬁcit that leaves lawmakers only marginally accountable for producing
collective goods”); Stuntz, Collapse of American Criminal Justice, supra note 16, at 244–56
(tracing the decline of local democratic control over criminal justice, which has left those
voters with the largest stake in the process with the smallest voice in relevant decisions);
Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 Mich. L. Rev.
187, 239 (2017) (noting that it is the poor and disenfranchised “who overwhelmingly suffer the cost of criminal justice’s externalities and whose voices often go unheard”);
Roberts, Social and Moral Cost, supra note 16, at 1291–98 (discussing the negative effects
of mass imprisonment on the participation of black communities in elections and labor
markets, and the resulting civic isolation in such communities).
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neighborhoods134 and teaches those who have contact with the criminal
justice system that they are not deserving of full participation.135
Even if it were possible to perfect representation, to assume that the
people speak through “the People” (or through any representatives) discounts more adversarial forms of participation that would challenge
everyday institutional practices. In other words, the focus on perfecting
public input into prosecution priorities ex ante facilitates the suppression
of input on behalf of defendants in individual cases. Because we assume
that the public should participate in criminal procedure through their
representatives, the system can feel free to treat interventions on the side
of the defendant as interference rather than participation. When we
interpret the will of the people, we do not take into account the input of
those who intervene on behalf of defendants: They are simply members
of the defendant’s support team, rather than members of the larger public whose views should dictate policing and prosecution priorities. As the
next section describes, running alongside this ideal of representation is a
second ideal, of a “neutral” public, which brings with it a related set of
limitations with respect to public participation in criminal justice.
C.

The Neutrality Problem

The second problem with the ideology of the people/defendant
dichotomy is that it creates a misleading and exclusionary ideal of a
“neutral” public that participates in the criminal justice process.136 The
ideal of a neutral public—a public that is both disinterested and decorous—is problematic because in practice it deﬁnes a neutral public as a
subset of the public that buys into the legitimacy of the current system
and the general priorities of current policing and prosecutorial practices.137 Those assumed to be opposed to the dominant approach of the
134. See, e.g., Lerman & Weaver, supra note 16, at 140 (describing how interacting
with the criminal process affects political engagement); Roberts, Constructing a Criminal
Justice System, supra note 24, at 279–83 (describing the criminal justice system’s “antidemocratic function”).
135. In the context of everyday policing, for example, Monica Bell has diagnosed the
ways in which “African Americans and residents of high-poverty neighborhoods . . . are . . .
structurally ostracized through law’s ideals and priorities.” Bell, supra note 58, at 2085–86.
136. The problem of neutrality goes beyond the public—there is also an assumption
of neutrality in the proceedings overall that Ion Meyn has argued distorts procedure in
unfair ways. See Ion Meyn, The Unbearable Lightness of Criminal Procedure, 42 Am. J.
Crim. L. 39, 56–60 (2014).
137. As a number of scholars have shown, this ideal of a subservient, obedient public is
echoed in constitutional jurisprudence as well. See, e.g., Capers, Good Citizen, supra note
25, at 654–57 (describing how criminal procedure doctrine conceives of the “good citizen”
as one willing to waive his rights); Miller, Encountering Resistance, supra note 26, at 300–
10 (arguing that challenging the police is “the way in which we assert our legal rights
against the government” while compliance vitiates protections provided by the Constitution);
Ristroph, Constitution of Police Violence, supra note 123, at 1215–38 (describing how
“constitutional doctrine expects and even demands suspects’ compliance across the board,”
with a duty of compliance that is disparately aimed at black and brown suspects).
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system are weeded out as biased, leaving us with a public predisposed to
uphold the status quo. And those who take on more adversarial forms of
participation are seen as disruptive, silencing counterviewpoints that
might otherwise add balance to our conceptions of justice.
The concept of a “neutral” public in criminal procedure begins by
excluding from its deﬁnition of the public those with criminal records or
prior contact with the criminal justice system, labeling them inherently
“biased.” The formal exclusion of individuals with criminal records from
participating in criminal justice as voters, jurors, and bail bond agents is
based, in part, on a belief that people with criminal records are too
biased to be neutral. One of the explicit justifications for disenfranchising individuals with felony criminal records, for example, is that
people with criminal records will be biased against sensible crime policies.138 Roger Clegg puts it this way: “If these laws did not exist there
would be a real danger of creating an anti-law enforcement voting bloc in
municipal elections, which is hardly in the interests of a neighborhood’s
law-abiding citizens.” 139 In congressional testimony, Senator Mitch
McConnell similarly worries that giving individuals with criminal records
the ability to vote would create a “voting bloc” that would make it hard to
be tough on crime.140 The idea that individuals with criminal records
might side with people accused of crimes, and that this is a bad thing, also
pervades the practices of everyday adjudication such as jury selection,141
bail,142 and the regulation of the courtroom audience.143 This idea, that
people with criminal records or police contact are too biased to be
included in public-facing procedures, furthers not only the isolation of
138. See Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disenfranchisement
and American Democracy 12–13 (2006) (describing the fear that people with criminal
records could “corrupt the ballot box” by loosening criminal laws as one of three central
arguments in favor of felon disenfranchisement); Alec C. Ewald, An “Agenda for
Demolition”: The Fallacy and the Danger of the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony
Disenfranchisement, 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 109, 111–22 (2004) (describing the fear
expressed by judges, politicians, academics, and advocates that individuals with criminal
records will sway elections to be “anti-law enforcement”).
139. Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 159, 177 (2001).
140. Manza & Uggen, supra note 138, at 12.
141. See Kalt, supra note 21, at 74–75 (noting that one “common basis offered for
felon exclusion [from jury service] is that felons are inherently biased”); Roberts,
Disparately Seeking, supra note 21, at 1403 (“The lack of inquiry into whether a connection with law enforcement or the criminal justice system automatically validates a strike,
whatever its disparate impact, suggests an assumption that a potential juror with such a
connection would have a negative view of the prosecution’s case.”).
142. See, e.g., Amber Widgery, Bail Bond Agent Licensure, Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/bailbond-agent-licensure.aspx [https://perma.cc/7H9D-T79A] (“[M]ost states will not issue
nor renew a license to those who commit a felony, a crime of moral turpitude or offenses
involving misappropriation of money or property.”).
143. See Simonson, Audience, supra note 79, at 2190–95 (describing the exclusion of
audience members—defendants and their supporters—from criminal courtrooms).
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individual defendants from public support but also the alienation of
entire neighborhoods from the political processes that do happen.144 The
result is the legitimation of exclusionary rules and practices that
maintain the antidemocratic nature of everyday criminal procedure.
The discourse surrounding the bias of individuals with criminal records is particularly strong in the realm of jury selection, where courts
throughout the United States comfortably exclude individuals with criminal records from juries, either under blanket policies or via individual
voir dire. When defendants have challenged the blanket exclusions of
individuals with criminal records from jury service, courts justify the practice with the idea of neutrality, based on “promot[ing] the legitimate
state goal of assuring impartiality of the verdict.”145 Judicial decisions discuss the “presumptively ‘shared attitudes’” of people with felony convictions146 and the “bias in favor of the defendant on trial, who is seen as a
fellow underdog caught in [the system’s] toils.”147 Whether or not it is
correct to say that people with criminal records are more likely to acquit
a defendant,148 the underlying idea is clear: Empathy toward defendants
as a general group of people accused by the state has no place in the
courtroom. This state interest in “impartiality” has been enough to

144. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and
the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1147, 1161 (2004) (“Criminal
disenfranchisement laws . . . operate as a kind of collective sanction: They penalize not
only actual wrongdoers, but also the communities from which incarcerated prisoners
come and the communities to which ex-offenders return by reducing their relative political clout.”).
145. Rubio v. Superior Court, 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979) (holding that a California
statute excluding ex-felons from jury service did not violate the Equal Protection Clause);
see also Kalt, supra note 21, at 73–75 (collecting cases justifying exclusion of people with
felony records on the grounds of jury probity and inherent bias). Note though that there
is another possible justiﬁcation—that potential jurors with felony convictions have exhibited poor judgment or character through past acts and would not be upstanding jurors. Cf.
United States v. Barry, 71 F.3d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[I]n most cases, by running
afoul of the law, accused persons have shown poor judgment . . . . Theirs is hardly the common-sense judgment of the community.”).
146. Carle v. United States, 705 A.2d 682, 686 (D.C. 1998) (“The presumptively
‘shared attitudes’ of convicted felons as they relate to the goal of juror impartiality are a
primary reason for the exclusion . . . .”).
147. Rubio, 593 P.2d at 600 (“The Legislature could reasonably determine that a person who has suffered the most severe form of condemnation that can be inﬂicted by the
state . . . might well harbor a continuing resentment . . . . [T]hese antisocial feelings
would . . . risk . . . prejudice infecting the trial . . . .”).
148. Recent research indicates that individuals with criminal records may actually not
be predisposed to favor defendants. See James M. Binnall, A Field Study of the
Presumptively Biased: Is There Empirical Support for Excluding Convicted Felons from
Jury Service?, 36 Law & Pol’y 1, 18 (2014) (conducting an empirical study that found “no
signiﬁcant difference between the group-level bias of convicted felons” and law students,
suggesting that other groups without felony records “are likely to exhibit statistically similar levels of prodefense/antiprosecution bias”).
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uphold constitutional challenges to the practice of excluding individuals
with felony records from juries.149
Similarly, courts have created a safe haven for prosecutors to strike
from juries individuals who hold negative views of police officers, even if
prospective jurors say that they could be impartial in assessing the evidence in the case.150 Rarely, if ever, do courts engage in the reverse
analysis, asking whether people without criminal records might have a
different kind of bias, of not understanding what it is like to go through
the process of arrest or accusation.151 Indeed, Batson jurisprudence is
generally resistant to allowing defense attorneys to exclude white jurors
because they may hold positive views of law enforcement.152 The assumption is that to be generally in favor of policing and prosecutorial policies
is to be neutral.
The institutional practices of state courthouses also tend to push
back against members of the general public who attempt to participate in
everyday justice on the side of defendants, labelling them as biased meddlers rather than healthy participants in everyday justice. Although the
First and Sixth Amendments together guarantee the right to a public
criminal adjudication, in practice local audiences are often excluded
from courtrooms, whether because courts create policies that explicitly
forbid public attendance at nontrial proceedings, because courtrooms
are too crowded, or because—in the case of courtwatching groups or
other activists intervening on behalf of defendants—the presence of
supporters of defendants undermines the “neutrality” of the proceedings.153 Some court officers tell members of the public who are there to
support a defendant but are not family members that they cannot enter
courtrooms.154 And it is not uncommon for courthouses to allow victims’
149. See Kalt, supra note 21, at 73–75 (collecting cases).
150. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking, supra note 21, at 1406–08 (describing Batson
cases that hold it unacceptable to strike a white juror because they may have a positive view
of law enforcement and contrasting those cases with those that allow prosecutors to strike
jurors of color who have negative experiences with law enforcement).
151. Cf. Abramson, supra note 43, at 887–93 (describing how jury deliberation actually
improves when the jury contains diverse points of view); Dov Fox, Neuro-Voir Dire and the
Architecture of Bias, 65 Hastings L.J. 999, 1042 (2014) (“The conception of jury bias that
much of impartiality doctrine takes for granted sweeps every source of outside inﬂuence
under that vague concept. No such monolithic conception of bias can meaningfully distinguish those outside sources of juror inﬂuence that inform a fair trial from those that infect
it.”); Martha Minow, Stripped Down like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1201, 1208 (1992) (discussing
“the danger of considering an initial appearance of bias without probing how others may
be similarly but more subtly implicated in the issue of bias”).
152. Roberts, Disparately Seeking, supra note 21, at 1406–07.
153. See generally Simonson, Audience, supra note 79 (describing these trends).
154. See, e.g., Sarah Geraghty & Melanie Velez, Bringing Transparency and
Accountability to Criminal Justice Institutions in the South, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 455,
468–70 (2011) (describing the closing of courtrooms in Georgia as a means of blocking
citizens from monitoring the criminal justice system).
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rights advocates to sit together and wear visible T-shirts or other indications of prosecutorial support but to exclude groups who wish to sit in
courtrooms visibly supporting defendants.155 The net result of these doctrines and practices is a watered-down vision of lay participation in public
adjudication in which to be “pro-defense,” “anti-police,” or “anti-prosecution” is a state of mind in conﬂict with the rule of law or the process of a
democratic criminal justice system.
Overall, then, the pervading sense that audiences and juries must
not be pro-defense or biased against the prosecution helps explain how
state actors meet direct communal participation on behalf of defendants
with either resistance or silence. When court clerks tell community groups
that they cannot post bail for strangers, for example, those clerks simply
cannot conceive of “neutral” reasons for a group to bail out a stranger.
The bail fund becomes a force infusing bias into a neutral system, rather
than a community group articulating a broader vision of justice that
involves supporting defendants whom they do not know personally.156 In
this way, the concept of a “neutral” public of which defendants are not a
part makes it that much easier to automatically cast those accused or
investigated as “other.” When we cannot imagine ourselves on the side of
the defendant, then we construct rules and analyze doctrine in distinctly
different ways than we might otherwise.157 The dominant ideology of
criminal procedure simply cannot account for communal participation
on behalf of defendants as anything other than “biased,” stiﬂing the
ability of these bottom-up visions to make their way into our everyday
understandings of criminal procedure.
III. PUTTING THE PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES: AN ALTERNATIVE VISION
In this Part, I put forth an alternative vision of criminal procedure
that conceives of public participation as a valuable input on both sides of
every criminal case. This vision centers on the notion that the public, or
the “community,” does not always stand in opposition to a defendant who
asserts an individual right or invokes a procedural rule. Instead, there is a
facet of the local public that is on the side of many defendants—and
potential defendants—as part of their own visions of justice and community.158 The people are not just on the side of the prosecution, and so we
155. See supra note 19.
156. Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, supra note 59, at 599–612.
157. Cf. Cover, Violence, supra note 22, at 1608 (noting that the “violence of the act of
sentencing is most obvious when observed from the defendant’s perspective” while the
communal meaning of the event “will tend to ignore the prisoner or defendant and focus
upon the judge and the judicial interpretive act”); Griffiths, supra note 29, at 385 (“[W]e . . .
persist in thinking of a convicted person as a special sort of individual, one cut off in some
mysterious way from the common bonds that unite the rest of us.”).
158. The idea that the public does not always stand against an individual defendant
ﬁnds some resonance in scholarship that critiques individual constitutional rights as a
legitimizing force in an unjust criminal justice system. See, e.g., Butler, Poor People Lose,
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should recognize the beneﬁt of facilitating resistance to individual
prosecutions by encouraging participation at multiple moments in the
criminal process. I begin with two theoretical ideas: ﬁrst, that democratic
criminal processes beneﬁt from facilitating communal, agonistic contestation; and second, that such democratic contestation requires moving
beyond the idea of prosecutors as representatives of the entire “People”
in the courtroom. I then ﬂesh out what putting “the People” on both
sides of a criminal case can look like on the ground.
A.

Communal Contestation Through Criminal Procedure

Criminal adjudication involves the prosecution of individual defendants for alleged law-breaking; but it need not follow that individual
defendants stand alone in the courtroom. If criminal justice is a public
enterprise, then we might open up both sides of a criminal case to public
participation and to contestation over the meanings of justice and fairness. Collective interventions on behalf of individual defendants allow
members of the public to connect the fates of those defendants to the
well-being of entire neighborhoods and communities.159 Groups of laypeople are able to demonstrate through action their disapproval of
individual prosecutions while simultaneously contesting existing priorities in local criminal law more broadly. When laypeople join collectively
to contest meanings of justice, they bring into the criminal courthouse
what Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres call “demosprudence”—the engagement of social movements with legal meaning.160 The criminal courthouse
can become a site of democratic contestation in which ordinary people’s
supra note 91, at 2178 (“Gideon . . . stands in the way of the political mobilization that will
be required to transform criminal justice.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda,
80 Calif. L. Rev. 673, 680 (1992) (arguing that “the legislative character of Brown and
Miranda actually allowed the Court to defuse the promise of radical transformation that
was immanent in prior precedent”); Louis Michael Seidman, Criminal Procedure as the
Servant of Politics, 12 Const. Comment. 207, 207 (1995) (“[T]he Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments function mostly to make us satisﬁed with a state of affairs that should trouble
us deeply.”); Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 31, at 4 (describing the “perverse
effects” of constitutional criminal procedure).
159. Cf. Bell, supra note 58, at 2083–89 (describing how people living in African
American and high-poverty neighborhoods experience at a communal level exclusion
from the polity as a result of criminal justice practices).
160. Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a
Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2740, 2743, 2749 (2014); see
also Moore, Decarceral Constitutionalism, supra note 80, at 30–40 (describing how social
movements shift constitutional meaning on the ground through efforts such as participatory defense). Demosprudence does not only happen outside of formal legal spaces, in
community meetings or protests; it can also happen inside courtrooms, when members of
the public engage in contestation alongside state actors, co-creating legal meaning. Cf.
Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 13–20
(2008) (describing how demosprudence can operate inside the Supreme Court courtroom
through oral dissents); Patel, supra note 25, at 867–77 (describing contestation within the
courtroom in the context of police consent decrees).
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visions of justice are placed on equal ground with those of elected prosecutors or judges. This communal resistance to prosecution can enrich
the public arena of justice, expanding the possible legal meanings that
we can attribute to any individual case or issue.
The conceptual shift I propose is intimately tied to the larger normative belief that direct forms of contestation are crucial for democratic
justice. Although this Essay does not aim to present a complete theory of
democracy by any means, there are at least four important aspects to how
I conceptualize democracy and political change that bear on this Essay’s
vision of criminal procedure. First, I share with a republican criminal justice ideal the view that giving officials too much power is dangerous; in
the context of criminal justice we should prioritize popular interventions,
including from social movements, that counter dominion. 161 Second,
moving beyond a neorepublican ideal, 162 my vision centers on the
importance of agonistic interventions in which people who participate
can remain opposed to the actors who ordinarily dominate the process.
With agonism, lay participation in the criminal legal system can take an
adversarial stance toward practices and ideologies of institutions in power
through engagement with those institutions, by acknowledging intractable differences but respecting the adversary who disagrees.163 Embedded
in this second idea is a third: a pluralist conception of the demos in
161. See John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of
Criminal Justice 7–11 (1990) (arguing that criminal justice should favor republican ideals
to maximize the “enjoyment of certain rights”); John Braithwaite, Criminal Justice that
Revives Republican Democracy, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1507, 1519–21 (2017) [hereinafter
Braithwaite, Criminal Justice] (arguing that the criminal justice system can be used to
counteract the antidemocratic forces of electoral populism and money in politics); cf.
Ekow N. Yankah, Republican Responsibility in Criminal Law, 9 Crim. L. & Phil. 457, 462–
63 (2015) (contrasting the antidomination strand of republican criminal theory with
Yankah’s concept of an Aristotelian or Athenian republican theory of criminal law). For
further development of these arguments, see infra notes 177–178 and accompanying text.
162. A neorepublican theory of criminal justice might prioritize restorative justice
rather than agonistic confrontation. Philip Pettit, in his work with John Braithwaite, has
connected his republican theory of democracy with a theory of criminal justice that centers in part on restorative justice. See Braithwaite & Pettit, supra note 161, at 120–24;
Braithwaite, Criminal Justice, supra note 161, at 1509–10. Similarly, John Griffiths, in his
takedown of Herbert Packer, would have had us move away from adversarialism toward a
“Family Model” of criminal procedure, a model that became an inspiration for John
Braithwaite in his pathbreaking vision of restorative justice. See Griffiths, supra note 29, at
372–73. But restorative justice, or a “Family Model,” assumes that a wrong has been
committed against a community and works from there to seek common ground in fashioning a punishment. Id. It does not allow for adversarial or agonistic engagement with the
criminal legal process.
163. See Mouffe, Agonistics, supra note 25, at 1–19 (arguing that democracy requires
“confrontation of democratic political positions” but that adversaries in such confrontations should not “call into question the legitimacy of their opponent’s right to ﬁght for the
victory of their position”); Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox 80–105 (2000)
(advocating for an agnostic model of democracy in which people treat the opposition as
“legitimate opponents”).
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which there is no one “public,” “people,” or “community” to whom state
actors are beholden, but rather multiple publics with contrasting ideas
about justice that cannot be easily reconciled.164 This is therefore not a
populist vision of criminal adjudication, in the sense that I oppose the
view that there is only one legitimate conception of who “the People”
are.165 The fourth important strand of this view of democratic criminal
justice is that popular participation need not be mediated through representatives, but can and should also spring up through direct forms of
participation and contestation.166
Under these conceptions of democracy and political change, the
answer to any disconnect between criminal processes and popular will is
not to move away from or supplement the adversarial process but rather
to bring into our debates over criminal procedure the merits of facilitating direct popular intervention on both sides of the “v.” Indeed, this way
of thinking about criminal procedure, in which the public has a part to
play on both sides of any case, highlights a potential beneﬁt of our
adversarial system of criminal adjudication: that it can facilitate important forms of contestatory participation in everyday justice that would
otherwise be muted in consensus-based methods of gathering popular
input into criminal justice. 167 Moreover, these forms of contestatory
participation are more likely to come from marginalized populations
with the least amount of power in the current system—the poor people
of color who are most likely to be arrested and prosecuted, as well as to
be victims of crime. Power can move through procedure: When a group
posts bail for a stranger, sits together in a courtroom to support a defendant, or makes a biographical video for a sentencing hearing, the members of that group shift power and agency dynamics inside the courthouse, destabilizing deeply entrenched legal and constitutional meanings. Dismantling the people/defendant dichotomy thus carries with it

164. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 134–45 (1956)
(describing American democracy as a political struggle among different groups); Sklansky,
Democracy, supra note 27, at 23–28 (summarizing the ways in which the pluralists saw
group conﬂict as the essence of politics).
165. See Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? 3–4 (2016) (describing a core belief of
populism that only some of the people are truly “the People”).
166. This view contrasts directly with the value in democratic pluralist theory placed
on the political elite as a sign of a healthy democracy. See generally Robert A. Dahl, Who
Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City (1961) (describing the importance
of political elites, or “homus politicus”).
167. See generally Sklansky, Democracy, supra note 27, at 86–97 (describing the dangers of the rising preoccupation with consensus-based forms of participation in policing).
This is not to say that consensus-based forms of participation do not have their place.
Agonistic engagement should complement, not replace, representation and deliberative
participation. Cf. Íñigo Errejón & Chantal Mouffe, Podemos: In the Name of the People
125 (2016) (describing the “synergy between electoral competition and the wide range of
struggles that take place in the social arena”); Miller, Encountering Resistance, supra note
26, at 296 (“Mature democracies are both participatory and contestatory . . . .”).
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the potential to push back against the antidemocratic nature of current
power relationships in criminal law and procedure.168
B.

Moving Beyond Representation

This vision of criminal procedure requires moving beyond
representation, particularly inside the courthouse. This does not require
that we abandon the use of prosecutors as representatives on the side of
prosecution or of jurors as occasional representatives during deliberations after a trial. But to rely only on these representatives results in an
illusory sense of representation of the polity as a whole: in the case of
prosecutors, because they cannot fully represent any one public; and in
the case of juries, because they are so rarely sworn in.
Our dependence on public representatives inside the courthouse is
not inevitable—the Constitution does not require that we engage in
criminal justice through representatives. Indeed, a structural reading of
the Bill of Rights underscores the importance of the public as a constant
presence, as jurors and as audiences, in the adjudication of criminal
cases.169 And, historically, the concept of the “jury of the whole” implicated the interest of the entire public in participating in individual cases
on all sides.170 As Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis have identiﬁed, one of
the central purposes of keeping courtrooms open to the public today is
that audience members can “deny[] the government and disputants
unchecked authority to determine the social meanings of conﬂicts and
their resolutions.”171 When we shift our understanding of public participation so that it runs through representatives such as prosecutors, however,
we mute other forms of direct engagement in everyday justice.
Moving beyond representation begins with a recognition that prosecutors do not fully represent “the People,” and therefore we should not
label them that way. States such as California, Illinois, Michigan, and New
168. See supra notes 59–79 and accompanying text; cf. Roberts, Constructing a
Criminal Justice System, supra note 24, at 279–85 (describing the criminal justice system’s
“anti-democratic function”).
169. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles
115–24 (1997) (describing the importance of public participation for constitutional criminal procedure); Simonson, Audience, supra note 79, at 2195–205 (“[T]he Sixth and First
Amendment rights to a public trial apply with full force to the protection of the audience
in the post-trial world.”).
170. See Susan N. Herman, The Right to a Speedy and Public Trial 25 (2006) (describing the concept of the “jury of the whole”).
171. Resnik & Curtis, supra note 79, at 302; see also Judith Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125
Harv. L. Rev. 78, 87 (2011) (“The presence of the public divests both the government and
private litigants of control over the meanings of the claims made and the judgments rendered and enables popular debate about and means to seek revision of law’s content and
application.”); cf. Kleinfeld, Three Principles, supra note 14, at 1483–88 (arguing that at
the time of the Founding, there was an understanding of criminal justice as belonging to
“We the People” and requiring the participation of the people).
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York should abandon that label on case captions and when referring to
individual prosecutors. Instead, it is more honest to designate prosecutors as “the State,” “the Commonwealth,” or “the Government”: They are
state actors, wielding their state power to prosecute individual defendants. This distinction matters. The words that we use to describe prosecutors make their way from courtroom dockets and Westlaw into courthouse conversations and popular culture. When I was a public defender
in New York City, it was common for judges, clerks, and other courtroom
players to refer to individual Assistant District Attorneys as “the People,”
as in, “Do the People have an offer?”; “Would the People like to request a
lunch break?”; or, if an ADA was not visible in the courtroom, “Are the
People in the bathroom?” Calling an individual prosecutor “the People”
sends a powerful message to courtrooms full of defendants waiting for
their cases to be called: a message that those defendants are not part of
“the People,” are not part of the public that matters. And to the public at
large, it sends the message that the good public, the “neutral” public,
cannot be on the side of the defendant.
This is not mere rhetoric; there is an important conceptual distinction between claiming that a prosecutor acts on behalf of the state and
claiming that a prosecutor acts on behalf of her community and is of the
community. As Michelle Madden Dempsey has argued, “[W]hilst
prosecutors necessarily represent their state, they may very well fail to
represent their community.”172 Dempsey follows R.A. Duff in arguing that
for the prosecution to represent the community, the prosecution must
meet conditions of political legitimacy by treating alleged wrongdoers
with respect, as members of that very community.173 Dempsey concludes
that this ideal, of an inclusive community of which defendants are a part,
is rarely if ever achieved in the United States.174 As a result, “[g]iven the
radical disparity between the actual and the ideal in prosecutorial practices and criminal justice systems more generally . . . it is unlikely that any
prosecutor acts on behalf of (represents) every member of her political
community.”175
Prosecutors may therefore be legitimate agents of the state—they
may be elected, a majority of the local citizenry may even have chosen
them—but it does not follow that they have permission to speak as an
agent of the community. Indeed, to speak of prosecutors as constitutive
of communal sentiment runs counter to the very concept of adversarial
prosecution by a public prosecutor. Paul Butler puts it this way: “In an
adversarial system, the prosecutor who is too sympathetic toward the

172.
173.
174.
175.

Dempsey, supra note 90, at 50.
Id. at 49–50 (citing R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishment 11 (1986)).
Id. at 49 (“Typically, of course, these conditions are not met . . . .”).
Id. at 52 n.24.
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defendant’s plight or too suspicious of the police is not doing her job.”176
An honest accounting of how our criminal justice system operates must
acknowledge that prosecutors engage not just in imperfect public representation but also in troublesome forms of power-wielding against relatively powerless people. In republican terms, prosecutors are sources of
state domination as much as of popular representation.177 To keep this
domination in check, we must ﬁrst acknowledge it. From there, we can
then facilitate and even encourage forms of communal contestation that
counter it.178
This contestation should not be mediated through representatives,
either public defenders or a new form of communal representative in the
courtroom. Public defenders are not in a position to provide an adequate
counterweight to prosecutors as community representatives. Public
defender offices are sometimes seen as representing communal interests,
either because they check the power of the prosecutors on behalf of
defendants in the aggregate,179 or because they adopt institutional postures
of being “community-based” or of advocating for larger political change
that beneﬁts their clients.180 However, the beneﬁcial roles of institutional
176. Butler, Hip-Hop Theory of Justice, supra note 119, at 115; see also Fish, supra
note 129, at 1420 n.4 (collecting similar sentiments from other sources).
177. See Braithwaite & Pettit, supra note 161, at 113–17 (arguing that, in light of the
power wielded by prosecutors, community policing and accountability systems are necessary to maintain communities’ sense of security and peace of mind); Kleinfeld, Manifesto,
supra note 41, at 1396 (“From Pettit, we can add to our mix of ideas the notion . . . that
police and prosecutors in the contemporary operation of American criminal justice may
enjoy a form of domination inconsistent with democratic freedom . . . .”); cf. John F. Pfaff,
Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration—and How to Achieve Real Reform 127
(2017) (describing the outsized power of prosecutors in criminal justice and arguing that
“[f]ew people in the criminal justice system are as powerful, or as central to prison growth,
as the prosecutor”); Angela J. Davis, Prosecutors, Democracy, and Race, in Prosecutors and
Democracy: A Cross-National Study, supra note 41, at 195, 195 (“Prosecutors are the most
powerful officials in the American criminal justice system.”).
178. See Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of
Democracy 187–293 (2012) (describing the need for popular contestation to counter
domination by public officials); K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domination:
Contesting Economic Power in Progressive and Neorepublican Political Theory, 16
Contemp. Pol. Theory 41, 46–56 (2017) (expanding the republican idea of popular
contestation to larger contestation against structural inequality); cf. Braithwaite & Pettit,
supra note 161, at 114 (arguing that the overall security and well-being of the community
“is frequently best served by not prosecuting”).
179. See Laura I. Appleman, The Community Right to Counsel, 17 Berkeley J. Crim.
L. 1, 60 (2012) [hereinafter Appleman, Community Right] (characterizing the defense
counsel as offsetting the state’s power to initiate a process with potential “collateral consequences that result in death, life imprisonment, or deportation”); Nirej Sekhon, Mass
Suppression: Aggregation and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Ga. L. Rev. 429, 474–77 (2017)
(“Embracing a community-oriented ethos requires that defenders imagine their advocacy
obligations beyond just obtaining favorable results in individual cases.”).
180. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating
Visions of the Public Defender, 84 Geo. L.J. 2419, 2457–62 (1996) (describing a then-growing trend of public defender offices becoming community-based institutional players).
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public defenders are different from, and can even conﬂict with, the
power of communal intervention on behalf of individual defendants.181
Although we might imagine a new kind of community representative who
could represent public interests in the courtroom,182 this second problem
would still remain: Such ombudsmen or public advocates would not
facilitate the shifts in power that characterize direct forms of communal
participation.
Instead of searching for perfect representatives of public will, then,
our system of criminal procedure must also facilitate direct, contestatory
forms of participation in criminal justice most often (but not exclusively)
found on the defendant side of the “v.” To be sure, precinct and courtroom actors should be democratically accountable.183 In recent years,
some local prosecutorial elections have been genuinely contested, and a
number of “progressive” prosecutors have won elections with promises of
reform, racial justice, and decarceration.184 These are promising developments for anyone interested in decarceration. And yet, we should be
careful not to let the high-proﬁle wins of progressive prosecutors further
re-entrench the notion that the public belongs only on the prosecution
side of the “v.”; even when a progressive prosecutor wins, she does not
represent the full community. As long as there are prosecutions against
181. This conﬂict manifests itself in two distinct ways. First, real conﬂicts of interest
can emerge between a public defender’s duty to her client and the stated or perceived
interests of local community groups; the interests may often be aligned, but sometimes
they may not be. It would strain the ability of an attorney to fully represent her client if she
also had to consider the interests of the neighborhood. And second, the acts of public
defenders working on behalf of supporters of a defendant cannot shift power relationships
in the way that bottom-up direct participation by marginalized populations can. See
Criminal Justice Standards for the Def. Function Standard 4-1.7 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourth
Edition.html [https://perma.cc/BMA6-X6BX] (describing how a defense attorney’s zealous
advocacy of her client must come before other loyalties, opinions, or obligations); see also
Godsoe, supra note 76, at 724 (describing this potential conﬂict in the context of
participatory defense); cf. Moore et al., supra note 68, at 1284–85 (describing the power
differentials between public defenders and marginalized populations who engage in
participatory defense).
182. See, e.g., Gold, Clientless Prosecutors, supra note 53, at 733–35 (proposing the
appointment of amici on behalf of the public).
183. For suggestions on how we might better do this, see generally, e.g., Appleman,
Community Right, supra note 179 (public defenders); Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra
note 47 (policing); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 Wash. L.
Rev. 69 (2011) (prosecutors); Sekhon, supra note 179 (public defenders); Thompson, It
Takes a Community, supra note 122 (prosecutors).
184. See David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. Davis
L. Rev. Online 25, 26 (2017) [hereinafter Sklansky, Progressive Prosecutor], https://
lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/online/vol50/Sklansky.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CM5-SPEM]
(describing the growing number of prosecutors who have won local elections based on a
“more balanced approach to criminal justice”); Paige St. John & Abbie VanSickle,
Prosecutor Elections Now a Front Line in the Justice Wars, Marshall Project (May 23,
2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/23/prosecutor-elections-now-a-frontline-in-the-justice-wars [https://perma.cc/VZV7-ZGW2].
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individual defendants, there will be members of the public who support
defendants, and there will be interests of the public that coincide with
the interests of defendants. The people will be on both sides.
C.

When the People Are on Both Sides

What does this new vision of criminal procedure look like on the
ground? There are examples all around us. Many existing forms of communal contestation demonstrate how agonistic participation can be a
powerful and productive force in local criminal justice, underscoring the
place of “the People” on the side of the defendant. The tactics that make
up participatory defense, for example, are powerful because they not
only help mitigate an individual defendant’s sentence, they also connect
the fate of that person to the public at large. A participatory defense
team might produce a biographical video to be shown in court that tells
an individual defendant’s personal story within the context of his
neighborhood and local community.185 Doing so demonstrates to the
court that, in the words of one participant, “there never is a sentence just
for the ‘defendant’, but rather . . . all the time of incarceration is shared
time.”186 Similarly, when a community bail fund posts bail for a stranger,
or for multiple strangers in a mass bailout, they declare through their
actions that they have a “shared destiny” with the people for whom they
post bail. 187 And these actions, in the aggregate, build power within
marginalized communities and push against established ideas of risk,
public safety, and justice.
We can imagine an approach to criminal procedure that treats tactics of communal contestation, such as participatory defense or mass
bailouts, as procedures worthy of consideration on an equal playing ﬁeld
with other mechanisms of generating public input. My argument is not
that any of these interventions are always normatively good or procedurally just. Indeed, as I discuss below, there may be aspects of participatory
defense or other movement tactics that make one pause to the extent
that they bump up against an ideal of the rule of law. But to think about
the popular thrust behind these interventions as being about communal
or democratic input, rather than simply the enforcement of individual
rights on behalf of one person, helps to situate their contribution and to
analyze their relative worth. We need to make the crucial conceptual shift
that movement actors have already made: that direct participation on the
side of the defense is not just about individual defendants but is also
185. See ACJPDEBUG, We Beat a 10 Year Sentence in New York with a Social Biography
Video!, Albert Cobarrubias Just. Project ( Jan. 7, 2015), https://acjusticeproject.org/
2015/01/07/we-beat-a-10-year-sentence-in-new-york-by-sharing-a-family-story-through-video/
[https://perma.cc/55H4-JNRJ].
186. Id.
187. Southerners on New Ground, supra note 66 (“This action allowed us to demonstrate our collective belief in a shared destiny with the dreams, demands and hopes of
black women in all of our varieties at the center.”).
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about larger democratic engagement and pushing for responsive justice
in a system that continues to ignore the input of marginalized populations.188
Imagining criminal procedure as a process of regulating popular
intervention on both sides of the “v.” opens up procedure to new ways of
thinking and acting. We can take account of the voices we include and
exclude in proceedings and realize these are not inevitable choices. We
can pay careful attention to the ways in which our current procedures
facilitate or impede bottom-up resistance to local police actions and
prosecutions from those who otherwise do not have a voice in the process. We can move beyond perfecting the community input into prosecution and the police in recognition that prosecutors and police departments can never truly represent a “community.” We can move toward a
jurisprudence of constitutional criminal procedure that acknowledges
communal harms and communal interests beyond the traditional idea of
“public safety.” And we can hesitate before discounting messy forms of
grassroots contestation in favor of the calm decorum of juries, elections,
or community policing.
In the sphere of policy, for example, state actors might overcome
their aversion to agonistic participation by enacting policies that allow for
disruptive but nonviolent forms of protest and intervention. States might
change their regulations for posting bail to allow community groups to
post bail for multiple people, for any defendant, and in any amount,
without taking a percentage of the money before returning bail at the
end of the case.189 Courtroom rules might shift to allow audiences to visibly
support defendants.190 States might change both the law and practice of
excluding from juries individuals with criminal records or a history of
contact with the police.191 State and local legislatures, courtroom rulemakers, police departments, and local prosecutors all have a role to play
in reexamining these official policies. This does not mean that state
actors should take control of these bottom-up interventions, for example

188. Cf. Akbar, Radical Imagination, supra note 56, at 479 (underscoring the importance of taking movement visions seriously in thinking about criminal justice).
189. See Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, supra note 59, at 634–36 (describing state policies that limit the amounts that charitable bail funds can post, charge fees for posting bail,
and otherwise make it difficult for community groups to post bail).
190. See Simonson, Audience, supra note 79, at 2222–32 (describing how courtroom
policies can change to be more inclusive of audiences, especially audience members who
support defendants).
191. See Kalt, supra note 21, at 142–48 (suggesting a series of statutory and judicially
driven reforms to implement this idea); see also Kleinfeld et al., supra note 53, at 1697
(“Practices of excluding citizens from juries based on their attitudes toward or histories
with the criminal justice system, both as a matter of law and as a matter of practice, should
be reduced in favor of a presumption of random selection and inclusion.”).
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through the creation of state-sponsored bail funds.192 Rather, state actors
should take the bold step of ceding power, of deliberately facilitating
power shifts down to the marginalized populations who traditionally have
the least input into everyday justice.193
Although for the most part this Essay has focused on courthouse
dynamics of contestation, these arguments hold with equal force in other
domains of criminal justice, including interactions with police officers on
the streets and roads, collective efforts to shift the policies of individual
prosecutors, and collective resistance by people in custody in jails and
prisons. In order to promote collective dissent against policing priorities,
localities might enact policies that respect the right of the people to
assemble, protest, record, and verbally dissent when observing police
interacting with people in public.194 And administrators of prisons and
jails might allow incarcerated people to engage in hunger strikes and
labor strikes, and to publicize their efforts beyond prison walls.195
A vision of criminal procedure that sees the “public interest” on
both sides of each criminal case should inform constitutional procedural
doctrines as well. This applies most directly to the doctrines structuring
public participation in the courtroom: Courts might interpret the First
and Sixth Amendments to give community members the right to dissent
and intervene in individual cases,196 and recognize the asymmetry of
Sixth Amendment rulings that sanction the exclusion of individuals with
criminal records as “biased” but ﬁnd no bias in those with pro-police or
pro-prosecutorial attitudes.197 Beyond these doctrines structuring public
participation, constitutional jurisprudence along a range of individual
rights would shift profoundly if it were to recognize the popular interest on
the side of defendants via the communal harms of arrests, prosecutions,

192. See Simonson, When the City Posts Bail, supra note 67, at 13–16 (arguing that
city bail funds are dangerous because they co-opt social movement tactics that shift power
relations).
193. For a provocative account of the importance of power and control in criminal
justice, see M Adams & Max Rameau, Black Community Control over Police, 2016 Wis. L.
Rev. 515, 529 (arguing that race-based policing policies will change only by shifting the
power dynamics between black communities and criminal justice system actors).
194. See Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras, supra note 18, at 1574–78.
195. See Goodman et al., supra note 56, at 12 (“[C]ollective action, individual refusals,
and other acts of contestation within penal institutions can have major effects on the development of criminal justice.”); cf. Lisa Guenther, Beyond Guilt and Innocence: The
Creaturely Politics of Prisoner Resistance Movements, in Active Intolerance: Michel Foucault,
the Prisons Information Group, and the Future of Abolition 225, 227, 232 (Perry Zurn &
Andrew Dilts eds., 2016) (describing a “community of resistance” that emerged during
hunger strikes at Pelican Bay); Dan Berger, Rattling the Cages, Jacobin (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/11/prison-strike-slavery-attica-racism-incarceration/
[https://perma.cc/8D8E-YT2P] (describing the labor strike by people in prisons throughout the United States in 2016).
196. See Simonson, Audience, supra note 79, at 2226–32.
197. See Roberts, Disparately Seeking, supra note 21, at 1403–04.
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incarceration, and punishment.198 Recognizing communal harms of arrests
and prosecutions would shift key constitutional calculations, such as with
respect to substantive due process,199 the Eighth Amendment right against
excessive bail,200 and the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.201
These are just examples. But they demonstrate that overcoming the
people/defendant dichotomy can have real on-the-ground consequences
for how we design and enforce our procedures and how we interpret our
constitutional rules. Envisioning the public intervening on both sides of
individual criminal cases requires resetting our assumptions about who
counts as democratic subjects in the administration of criminal law and
how democratic participation happens in individual cases. By expanding
our notions of participation, we might be able to move closer to a criminal legal system that is more inclusive and responsive to the public it
claims to serve.
IV. RESISTANCE, THE RULE OF THE LAW, AND DECARCERATION
In this concluding Part, I ﬂesh out some implications of putting the
people on both sides of individual criminal cases for the moment that
the United States ﬁnds itself in today: facing a carceral state that has
ballooned out of control.202 Despite widespread, though not universal,
acknowledgement of the urgent need for large-scale criminal law

198. See Baughman, Pretrial Detention, supra note 104, at 4–7 (describing the social
and communal harms of pretrial detention); Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 133, at 213–
18 (describing the collective costs to the public of the punishment of individuals); Yang,
supra note 104, at 1423–29 (same). Constitutional doctrine itself also has profound social
harms. See, e.g., Capers, Good Citizen, supra note 25, at 663–79 (describing citizenship
harms that come from Fourth Amendment doctrine); Carbado, Fourth Amendment,
supra note 115, at 966 (describing the social harms of Fourth Amendment doctrines to
black people in the United States).
199. See Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, supra note 59, at 625–28 (discussing how
substantive due process analysis shifts in the context of bail and pretrial detention when
“the community” is recognized as a force on both sides of the constitutional calculus).
200. Id. at 628–31.
201. See Baradaran, supra note 103, at 3–4 (describing how judges making Fourth
Amendment reasonableness determinations tend to defer to government interests without
considering beneﬁts to the public of ruling in favor of a defendant); Bierschbach, supra
note 47, at 1451 (“[C]ourts applying the Fourth Amendment could fold the outlooks of
victims of police abuse, innocent civilians, and communities of color into their reasonableness analysis.”); I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship,
and the Equality Principle, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 37–48 (2011) (arguing that Fourth
Amendment doctrine should take into account broader “citizenship harms,” particularly
to African Americans).
202. See generally Nat’l Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United
States: Exploring Causes and Consequences (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) (examining
the massive increase in incarceration in the United States since the 1970s).
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reform,203 mainstream reforms have yet to truly change the fundamental
aspects of a system that arrests, prosecutes, and imprisons vast swaths of
its population,204 with striking inequalities along lines of race, class, and
gender.205 The most marginalized populations in the country are stuck in
a cycle of imprisonment and supervision; they are “Caught,”206 “Locked
In,”207 and suffocated in a “Chokehold”208—to name the titles of three
recent scholarly books analyzing the problem. Marie Gottschalk (author
of Caught) argues that the only way to achieve large-scale decarceration is
to allow ourselves to be open to “convulsive politics from below”209—to
collective resistance that can open up political room for transformation.210 A number of other scholars, including Amna Akbar, Paul Butler,
Allegra McLeod, Janet Moore, Dorothy Roberts, and Jonathan Simon,
echo this idea: that our current moment demands extraordinary kinds of
interventions into our modes of criminal justice, and that, today, the
most inspiring visions for how to do this are found in on-the-ground
movements for social and racial justice.211
203. Cf. Levin, supra note 37, at 260–65 (arguing that this “consensus” for criminal
justice reform actually contains conﬂicting accounts of the problems and solutions to
dismantle the carceral state).
204. Cf. Pfaff, supra note 177, at 1 (“The statistics are as simple as they are shocking:
the United States is home to 5 percent of the world’s population but 25 percent of its
prisoners.”).
205. See Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, supra note 29, at 75 (“But there are at least ﬁve
factors—classics, if you will—that capture much of the dynamic and explain how the law
often works differently for different people under different circumstances. Those ﬁve
phenomena are offense severity, race, gender, class, and defense counsel . . . .”); Jonathan Simon,
Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of America’s Peculiar Carceral State
and Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1625, 1627
(2017) (“With striking evidence of racial disproportionality in all aspects of its operations,
the U.S. carceral state confronts an acute deﬁcit, or even crisis, of legitimacy.”).
206. Gottschalk, supra note 56.
207. Pfaff, supra note 177.
208. Paul Butler, Chokehold: Policing Black Men (2017) [hereinafter Butler,
Chokehold].
209. Gottschalk, supra note 56, at 282 (calling for “convulsive politics from below that
we need to dismantle the carceral state and ameliorate other gaping inequalities”).
210. Id. at 2 (“For those seeking to dismantle the carceral state, . . . [t]he real challenge is ﬁguring out how to create a political environment that is more receptive to . . .
reforms and how to make the far-reaching consequences of the carceral state into a leading political and public policy issue.”).
211. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Chokehold, supra note 208, at 247 (calling for a “more
open-minded perspective on . . . resistance” within the Movement for Black Lives); Butler,
Hip-Hop Theory of Justice, supra note 119, at 133 (“[T]he hip-hop nation, and especially
its black and Latino citizens, are best situated to design a criminal justice system.”); Akbar,
Radical Imagination, supra note 56, at 473 (arguing that we should study and listen to the
“radical imagination” of movement actors and their visions for change); McLeod, Carceral
State, supra note 56, at 705 (arguing that the “ambitious visions of decarceration [from
movement actors] offer a set of transformative aspirational ideas which might orient
current reform efforts, rescuing more moderate criminal-law reform from its weakest and
most disappointing possible futures”); Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law, supra note
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But does “convulsive politics from below” really belong inside the
criminal courthouse? This Essay’s vision of criminal procedure would
bring bottom-up contestation over criminal law and policy directly into
courtrooms, and directly into individual cases, presenting a challenge to
conventional understandings of the rule of law and procedural uniformity. In this Part, I confront this tension, defending a conception of
criminal procedure in which “the People” are on both sides against the
charge that doing so presents an insurmountable problem for the rule of
law. I argue that in our present historical moment the risk of partially
undermining the dominant idea of the rule of law is, overall, worth the
upside of facilitating popular engagement by marginalized populations
into a criminal legal system characterized by mass incarceration and supervision of those very populations. This is because popular interventions on
behalf of defendants, and in opposition to a state claiming to represent
“the People,” provide a method of opening up a closed and alienating
criminal justice system to a set of beliefs in the need for decarceration
and even abolition held by subsets of the public that have for too long
been excluded from public discourse.
A.

Communal Resistance and the Rule of Law

There is not a neat relationship between opening up criminal
adjudication to direct participation on the side of defendants and
protecting rule of law values. Many forms of direct participation in everyday adjudication operate squarely within established legal rules, for
example when community bail funds post bail for strangers while following state and courthouse rules regarding the posting of bail, or
courtwatching groups exercise their First Amendment right to observe
courtroom proceedings.212 And yet, structuring local courtrooms to facilitate popular interventions on behalf of defendants may present dangers
to the rule of law by facilitating unequal, irregular, or even oppressive
forms of resistance to the ordinary criminal process. Here we might
imagine, for instance, a version of white supremacist jurors nullifying
47, at 1607 (calling for a vision of democracy in which “black communities have greater
freedom to envision and create democratic approaches to social harms—for themselves
and for the nation as a whole”); Simon, supra note 205, at 1650 (“Reconstructing the carceral state will require a democratic process that involves impacted communities ﬁrst and
foremost in re-norming the abnormality against which the carceral state operates.”);
Moore, Decarceral Constitutionalism, supra note 80, at 57–73 (connecting participatory
defense and other movement-led tactics to the possibility of decarceration).
212. Indeed, one danger with communal interventions that promote the rule of law in
this way is that they will legitimize an unjust system by giving it the appearance of fairness
and regularity. See Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, supra note 59, at 635–37 (describing this
danger in the context of community bail funds); cf. Robin West, From Choice to
Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 Yale L.J. 1394, 1406
(2009) (describing how some law reform can “legitimate a deeper or broader injustice
with the legal institution so improved, thus further insulating the underlying or broader
legal institution from critique”).
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extralegal lynchings of African Americans in the South:213 A contemporary group intervening in a criminal case and driven by prejudice
might promote rather than counter oppression and inequality.214 Or, if a
group is not acting out of prejudice, the group may be acting with the
knowledge that they are not contributing to the good of the greater
community by supporting a defendant. And even with good intentions, a
collective intervention in an individual case might still undermine
broader goals of uniformity and regularity when social movement actors
choose to intervene in some, but not other, courtrooms and cases.
Whether these communal interventions into individual cases seem
problematic will depend on one’s idea of the rule of law—a notoriously
contested concept.215 For example, a traditional formalist conception of
the rule of law, one insisting that judges must enforce all procedural
rules in a neutral and uniform way, free of prejudice or popular meddling, might clash with a vision of popular intervention on the side of
defendants.216 Opening up decisionmaking at the individual level to the
impulsive or biased preferences of unelected groups would imperil the
neutrality and generality of criminal justice on the ground. In contrast, a
more “responsive” conception of the rule of law might welcome popular
intervention when it allows members of the public to engage in the process of deﬁning the contours of legal meaning in adjudication.217 This
213. See Michal R. Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order: Racial Violence and
Constitutional Conﬂict in the Post-Brown South 20, 25, 32, 54–55, 120–24 (1987) (detailing
numerous cases in which Southern juries acquitted defendants of racial-violence charges
despite signiﬁcant evidence of guilt).
214. Cf. Brown, supra note 120, at 1196 (“There is a class of nulliﬁcation verdicts that
violates the rule of law; decisions by southern white juries are one example of that class.
Closely examined, however, those instances are likely to involve circumstances in which
the rule of law would fail regardless of juries’ involvement.”).
215. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 42, at 10–24 (describing four differing conceptions of
the rule of law).
216. Compare id. at 18–19, 31–32 (describing the Legal Process conception of the rule
of law, which “attempt[s] to root law at least partly in a current normative consensus perceived as adequate to validate particular decisionmaking processes and their outcomes as
lawful”), with supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text (describing a conception of the
rule of law that focuses on systemic inputs during the lawmaking process and neutral
application during the adjudication process). This formalist conception of the rule of law
accords with what Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick call “autonomous law,” in which
“[r]egularity and fairness, not substantive justice, are the ﬁrst ends and the main competence of the legal order.” Nonet & Selznick, supra note 23, at 54.
217. See, e.g., Nonet & Selznick, supra note 23, at 96 (defending the similar idea of
legal pluralism, in which “legal action comes to serve as a vehicle by which groups and
organizations may participate in the determination of public policy”); see also id. at 77
(describing responsive legal institutions as those which open themselves up to adaptation
by “perceiv[ing] social pressures as sources of knowledge and opportunities for self-correction”); Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. Rev.
209, 259 (2015) (“Responsive theories of law tend to be receptive to increased opportunities for participation in the legal process and to relatively expansive notions of the role of
law.”).
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conception of the rule of law would welcome multiple sources of legal
authority218 and might even welcome some irregularity in the interest of
promoting legal decisionmaking that is more responsive to social needs
and local democratic inputs. Many communal interventions into everyday justice ﬁt comfortably into an idea of the rule of law that encourages
multiple sources of legal authority, including direct public participation.
When community bail funds post bail, for example, they help shape legal
and constitutional understandings of the institution of money bail and
the meanings of concepts like “community” and “public safety.”219 Under
a responsive ideal of the rule of law, such communal interventions on the
side of defendants represent a desirable form of popular participation in
the production of legal meaning.
One’s view of how communal resistance in the criminal courthouse
ﬁts within the rule of law will therefore go hand in hand with one’s
conception of how the contours of the rule of law interact with democracy, participation, and lawmaking. Moreover, it will depend on how one
views the potential of political engagement in individual criminal cases, a
theme echoed in the scholarly debate over jury nulliﬁcation.220 Although
beyond the scope of this Essay, this complex analysis will be an important
job for future work: to parse through various mechanisms of facilitating
popular participation, and to reject some while embracing others, along
a range of conceptions of the rule of law and its relationship to substantive justice. For now, one might agree with the central argument of this
Essay—that our methods of everyday adjudication would beneﬁt from
moving beyond a neat dichotomy between the interests of the public and
the interests of the defendant—without endorsing all forms of communal
218. See Brown, supra note 120, at 1161–66; see also id. at 1164 (“[T]he rule of law
not only permits interpretation of rules through such sources [outside of the written law]
in a manner that may yield results very different from literal rule application, but may
require it.”); cf. Morton J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualiﬁed Human Good?, 86
Yale L.J. 561, 566 (1977) (book review) (“[The rule of law] creates formal equality—a not
inconsiderable virtue—but it promotes substantive inequality by creating a consciousness that
radically separates law from politics, means from ends, processes from outcomes.”).
219. See Simonson, Bail Nulliﬁcation, supra note 59, at 612–31 (describing how
community bail funds contest the meaning of “community” and engage in legal and political change).
220. Compare Brown, supra note 120, at 1169–71 (arguing that jury nulliﬁcation falls
within the rule of law), and Carroll, Nulliﬁcation, supra note 120, at 621 (stating that jury
nulliﬁcation “creates a mechanism to lend predictability and knowability to the law when
formal constructs have failed to align themselves with the citizen’s own expectations”),
with Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nulliﬁcation, 82 Va. L. Rev. 253, 299–300 (1996)
(“There is some force to [the] arguments [for jury nulliﬁcation], but not enough to justify
the existing nulliﬁcation doctrine.”), and Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nulliﬁcation:
Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677, 705 (1995) [hereinafter
Butler, Black Power] (“The idea that jury nulliﬁcation undermines the rule of law is the
most common criticism of the doctrine.”). For a summary of this debate, see Kaimipono
David Wenger & David A. Hoffman, Nulliﬁcatory Juries, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 1115, 1131–33
(2003).
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resistance in the courthouse. And one could support changes in formal
rules—for example, changing rules for posting bail that inhibit the work
of community bail funds—in an effort to bring existing strategies of
communal intervention in sync with formal ideals of the rule of law.
But this is not the end of the matter. Running alongside divergent
conceptions of the rule of law is yet another idea: that we might need to
set aside our complete ﬁdelity to the rule of law (however conceived) in
the face of widespread injustice. Carol Steiker’s writings on the relationship between mercy and the rule of law bring out this idea. Steiker argues
that when institutional relationships result in overly harsh treatment and
punishment of defendants, the idea of mercy can provide a “necessary
counterbalance.”221 In this account, opening up the processing of individual criminal cases to mechanisms of discretionary mercy might be scary
and unpredictable, and even run counter to the rule of law; and yet, the
ideal of mercy may still be necessary to combat the harsh nature of
everyday criminal justice.222 As Steiker writes of the alarming nature of
some forms of jury nulliﬁcation, “[I]n our time, the alternative—the
unending spiral of mass incarceration—looks a lot worse.”223 In a similar
vein, Paul Butler has written with respect to race-based jury nulliﬁcation
that “[i]f the rule of law is a myth, or at least is not applicable to AfricanAmericans, the criticism that jury nulliﬁcation undermines it loses
force.”224 Under this view of the relationship between justice and the rule
of law, the importance of the rule of law bends in the face of widespread
injustice such as that found in the American carceral state. If in the vast
majority of cases we do not have a baseline of the rule of law, then our
ﬁdelity to it is misplaced.
This critique continues to resonate in the United States today, where
we face an “unending spiral of mass incarceration,” in the context of a
set of criminal procedures that lead people most impacted by everyday
criminal adjudication to conclude that the rule of law is, indeed, a myth.
This is especially true at the bottom of the “the penal pyramid,” where
“rules hardly matter at all” as state actors rush poor people and people of
color through the court system without careful attention, purpose-giving,
or adjudication of guilt or innocence.225 At the bottom of the penal
221. Carol S. Steiker, Tempering or Tampering? Mercy and the Administration of
Criminal Justice, in Forgiveness, Mercy, and Clemency 16, 31 (Austin Sarat & Nasser
Hussain eds., 2007) [hereinafter Steiker, Tempering or Tampering].
222. Id. at 30–32; see also Carol S. Steiker, Sculpting the Shape of Nulliﬁcation
Through Jury Information and Instruction, in Criminal Law Conversations 553, 553–54
(Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter Steiker, Sculpting the Shape] (arguing
that although jury nulliﬁcation may be alarming in some instances, nulliﬁcation is necessary to counteract the spread of mass incarceration).
223. Steiker, Sculpting the Shape, supra note 222, at 554.
224. Butler, Black Power, supra note 220, at 708. See generally Steiker, Tempering or
Tampering, supra note 221 (arguing that mercy is a potentially appropriate way of mitigating the “draconian harshness of our current penological regime”).
225. Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, supra note 29, at 72.
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pyramid, the rule of law begins to disappear.226 This recognition might
relax our idea of what kind of participation the system allows, up to when
it clashes with due process concerns for individual defendants. 227
Depending on the “rules” governing any one mechanism of participation, to open up the criminal courtroom to new forms of participation
might require being comfortable undermining the rule of law in order to
promote larger ideals of substantive justice in an unequal or unfair
system. Indeed, it may be that it is precisely these forms of popular
participation that offer the greatest hope for pushing back against the
“unending spiral[s]” of mass incarceration, supervision, and police violence that make up the carceral state. Drawing inspiration from this
conception of the place of the rule of law in a profoundly unjust system,
in the next and last section of this Essay I gesture toward a direct
connection between facilitating communal interventions in criminal
adjudication on behalf of defendants and the possibility of large-scale
decarceration.
B.

Procedure and the Possibility of Decarceration Today

We cannot separate out the intractability of mass incarceration from
the powerlessness of those caught up in it.228 Part of the path toward
decarceration may therefore lie in opening up criminal justice institutions to the relatively powerless voices who have not played a large role in
getting us to the place where we are.229 There is reason to believe that if
we open up criminal procedure to more popular input from below, the
result would be a system that is profoundly skeptical of much of the status
quo in criminal justice today. To be sure, not all bottom-up interventions
on behalf of defendants will be interventions that we all can agree are
226. Carroll, Nulliﬁcation supra note 120, at 581 (“[A]dhering too closely to any
particular ideal of the rule of law leaves large swaths of the actual experience of governance and lawmaking unaccounted for.”).
227. See Simonson, Audience, supra note 79, at 2204–05 (discussing how the individual rights of a defendant to due process and a fair trial trump the rights of audience members to participate in everyday courtroom proceedings).
228. See Walker, supra note 41, at 8 (“At every point in the history of [American]
criminal justice, the people arrested, prosecuted, and punished have been mainly the poor
and powerless.”); Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice System, supra note 24, at 279–
86; Moore, Decarceral Constitutionalism, supra note 80, at 9–11.
229. Cf. Barker, supra note 133, at 2 (arguing that “increased democratization can
support and sustain less coercive penal regimes” by bringing in less privileged political
opinions); Miller, Mob Rule, supra note 133, at 8 (“The more non-elites can successfully
inﬂuence government policy over collective securities—the more the mob rules—the more
likely the political system will address security from violence as a collective good and will
moderate its use of repressive practices.”); Sklansky, Democracy, supra note 27, at 191
(“[S]ensitivity to the oppositional side of democracy—the tradition of anti-inegalitarianism—can help to keep us focused on the ways in which policing can buttress, or alternatively can destabilize, entrenched patterns of illegitimate domination.”); Simon, supra
note 205, at 1648–50 (arguing that the rising illegitimacy of the criminal justice system in
the era of Black Lives Matter presents an opportunity for transformative change).
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good ones, but they will tend to be interventions that shift power
imbalances: not just shifting power away from prosecution but also
shifting power away from the dominant idea that the criminal legal
system is the best and only way to contend with communal ills. In this
way, opening up criminal procedure to allow “the People” to support
defendants facilitates discourses that are part of an “abolitionist ethic”—
what Allegra McLeod describes as a “gradual project of decarceration,”
changing how we think about the purposes of criminal law and procedures themselves.230
Drawing a direct line between collective participation in individual
cases and the larger project of decarceration surely requires more study.
And perhaps recent electoral victories by “progressive” prosecutors, such
as former civil rights lawyer Larry Krasner in Philadelphia,231 undermine
the notion that it is the only way to achieve decarceration.232 But, signiﬁcantly, this is how movement actors engaging in collective practices on
behalf of defendants understand their work: as a way to build the power
necessary to truly transform criminal justice. When activists post bail for a
stranger, or engage in a participatory defense campaign, they see themselves as “practicing abolition every day”233 and engaging in “abolition in
the now”234—moving away from the incarceration of poor people and
people of color, and toward other ways of addressing wrongdoing and
promoting public safety. These movement actors bring with them
sophisticated understandings of the history and discourse surrounding
seemingly neutral procedures—their intention is not simply to intervene
using existing procedures but also to disrupt the normalcy of those
procedures by laying bare the ways in which they function to perpetuate

230. Allegra M. McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA L. Rev.
1156, 1161 (2015); see also Butler, Chokehold, supra note 208, at 229–47 (describing
approaches to criminal justice reform that ﬁt into an abolitionist ethic); Akbar, Radical
Imagination, supra note 56, at 460–73 (describing the abolitionist ethic of the Movement
for Black Lives).
231. See Harrison Jacobs, The Inside Story of How Trump United a City of Activists to
Elect the Most Progressive District Attorney in a Generation, Bus. Insider (Nov. 12, 2017),
https://www.businessinsider.com/larry-krasner-philadelphia-election-platform-trump-2017-11
[https://perma.cc/KL9U-9EPR].
232. See generally Sklansky, Progressive Prosecutor, supra note 184, at 26 (describing a
growing number of prosecutors who have won local elections based on a “more balanced
approach to criminal justice”).
233. Mariame Kaba, Take No Prisoners, Vice (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.vice.com/
en_us/article/mending-our-ways-0000775-v22n10 [https://perma.cc/X86N-FTEJ] (describing how a number of activist organizations, including that of the author, “are practicing
abolition every day . . . by creating local projects and initiatives that offer alternative ideas
and structures for mediating conﬂicts and addressing harms without relying on police or
prisons”).
234. Grant, supra note 65 (quoting Mary Hooks of SONG as describing Mama’s Bail
Out Day as a form of “abolition in the now”).
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structural inequalities.235 With bail, for example, the goal of community
bail funds is rarely to become permanent ﬁxtures of a local pretrial system, but rather to push for the abolition of bail and even pretrial
detention altogether.236 These groups do not simply study or document
widespread forms of inequality; rather, they practice the undoing of those
forms of inequality through collective acts of intervention in individual
cases.
Communal support of a defendant can thus be disruptive in the
sense that it can call into question basic assumptions about the operation
of everyday justice. But such collective resistance is not mere protest or
civil disobedience; it is a method of democratic contestation over the
meaning of justice in a structured and civil setting. Agonistic participation is a way to bring in collective viewpoints that call into question our
modes of criminal law and procedure themselves and yet do so under
regulated conditions that demand respect for both sides.237 To allow the
people in on both sides does not require that we abolish the police, end
all prosecutions of misdemeanors, or close all jails and prisons, but it
does demand that we be open to putting those options on the table.238 In
this way, constructing criminal procedures so that they allow participation on the side of the defendant can help produce a more substantial
public discourse over legal, political, and constitutional meaning in the
realm of criminal law.
Maintaining an adversarial system with the people on both sides
makes room for forms of popular intervention that either deny that a
235. Cf. Akbar, Radical Imagination, supra note 56, at 421–60 (describing the nuanced
legal thinking of social movement actors in the Movement for Black Lives).
236. See Brian Sonenstein, As Abolition Becomes More Likely, Chicago Bond Fund
Sees Future Where They Aren’t Needed, Shadowproof (May 9, 2017), https://
shadowproof.com/2017/05/09/chicago-bond-fund-series-part-two/ [https://perma.cc/
2MLF-UXC7]; see also Weiss, supra note 59 (describing the abolitionist goals of many
community bail funds, which aim to “create space to identify and then experiment with
new structures that hold people in crisis in ways that are not punitive but instead accountable to communities and concerned with repair and prevention”). Bail funds demonstrate,
for example, that “transformative” bail reform will require “a historically grounded understanding of the inherent anti-Blackness of our criminal punishment system and an
exploration of how many proposed reforms continue to re-entrench oppression and to
prioritize profit over people.” Color of Change et al., Transformative Bail Reform: A Popular
Education Curriculum 3 (2016), https://policy.m4bl.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
Transformative-Bail-Reform-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NXA-XMZK].
237. See Mouffe, Agonistics, supra note 25, at 9 (“In an agonistic politics, . . . what is at
stake is the struggle between opposing hegemonic projects which can never be reconciled
rationally, one of them needing to be defeated. It is a real confrontation . . . played out
under conditions regulated by a set of democratic procedures accepted by the adversaries.”).
238. Cf. Akbar, Radical Imagination, supra note 56, at 471 (“One might disagree with
the argument to abolish police, but having the debate is itself productive, as it forces
conversations about the otherwise-taken-for-granted values of police and incarceration.”);
Simon, supra note 205, at 1650 (describing the need “to lay the ground work for any serious democratic discourse over how to reshape the carceral state”).
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wrong has been committed at all, or, more provocatively, seek to unearth
the ways in which the allegation of a wrong can serve as a cover for forms
of social control and group domination. Our consensus-based methods
of trying to facilitate discussions and deliberation around issues of local
justice have not been up to the task of lifting up these ideas on their own.
Moving beyond consensus, we can also create contestatory spaces in which
the public can hash out competing perspectives on the meaning of
justice in their communities, pushing us to consider new ways of thinking
about and reacting to violent or undesirable conduct. If these voices,
opinions, and visions are not a part of the discourse around criminal law
and procedure, then we risk failing to ask ourselves the most difficult
questions about whether our dominant modes of processing criminal
cases are right or just. Public participation on both sides of criminal cases
therefore carries with it the potential to lead us not just to more democratic criminal law but also to less criminal law.239
CONCLUSION
Herbert Packer believed that by theorizing competing models of
criminal procedure, he could in turn shift on-the-ground practices and
understandings of why and what we punish.240 At the same time, Packer
cautioned that there was a limit to due process, writing that “[w]e sorely
need to . . . ask ‘what’ and ‘why’ [we punish] before we ask ‘how.’”241 In
this Essay, I have attempted to argue the inverse proposition: By expanding
the “how”—by opening up our procedures to communal contestation—
we can facilitate more productive interchanges on “what” and “why”
criminal adjudication should be. Without the voices of the most
marginalized, that conversation—over the meaning of justice, over how
to best respond to wrongdoing—will not truly reﬂect the full scope of the
multiple publics who are a part of everyday justice.
We are in the throes of a new age of local criminal law and policy
reform in the United States, reform that goes beyond changing substantive criminal law statutes and rewriting sentencing laws to include bigpicture rethinking of our criminal processes. If we can value public
participation beyond representation by the police and prosecution, then
239. It is no coincidence that Nonet and Selznick, in their typology of conceptions of
the rule of law, identiﬁed “responsive law” with a decrease in the use of the criminal law
and criminal sanctions overall. See Nonet & Selznick, supra note 23, at 89–92 (describing
how responsive law involves a reduction in the use of criminal sanctions).
240. In particular, Packer believed that the preferable model—the “due process
model”—would provide enough roadblocks to “assembly-line justice” so as to make us
realize the need to eliminate “the endless procession of look-alike cases, especially through
the lower criminal courts.” Packer, Limits, supra note 28, at 292; cf. Aviram, supra note 29,
at 238–45 (analyzing Herbert Packer’s models of criminal procedure within the context of
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence).
241. Packer, Limits, supra note 28, at 366.
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we can open up our visions of how we craft criminal procedure and interpret doctrine in new and important ways, moving toward local criminal
adjudication that is more responsive to the multidimensional demands of
the popular will.
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